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THE UN’S WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE 2012 – 2016 COLOMBIAN PEACE PROCESS 
 
A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY TO ENHANCE WOMEN’S RIGHTS? 
 
Hannah Schaper 
 
Abstract  
In order to tackle the historical omission of women’s contributions to processes of 
conflict resolution, the United Nations Security Council has been following a broad 
agenda on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) since the year 2000 to increase women’s 
participation in official peace negotiations and peace agreement implementation 
processes. The peace talks between the Colombian government under President Juan 
Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), taking place 
in Havana from 2012-2016 officially brought an end to one of the world’s longest-
running conflicts. Lauded by the international community due to its sensitivity with 
regard to women’s and victim’s rights, the latest Colombian peace process is portrayed 
as a potential role model for future peacebuilding initiatives. With the UN acting as a 
facilitator of the Havana peace talks, this thesis aims to deepen our understanding of the 
WPS framework’s effectiveness. Through an analysis of the final peace accord as well 
as a number of Transitional Justice and Disarmament, Demobilisation, and 
Reintegration measures surrounding the peace process, this thesis measures compliance 
between the process and the goals promoted by the UN’s WPS agenda. Additionally, 
interviews conducted during a field trip to Bogotá, are used to complement this analysis. 
The findings suggest that the WPS framework is reflected in the current Colombian 
peace process both with regard to the framework’s aims and its shortcomings. Attention 
is dedicated to the active ‘participation’ of women in matters of constructing a 
Colombian post-conflict society, and to measures of ‘relief and recovery’, with regard to 
victims of conflict-related sexual violence in particular. Strategies of ‘prevention’ and 
‘protection’ of the rights and bodies of women as envisioned by the WPS agenda fall 
short in the Colombian context to the extent that despite the fact that a number of laws 
exists, their implementation, however, remains flawed. 
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1. Introduction  
“In failing to include women and girls in peacemaking and peacebuilding processes, we are not 
only failing women and girls. We are failing the world.” (Former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon, 2016) 
 
The internal armed conflict taking place in Colombia between the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the armed revolutionary forces of Colombia, 
and the country’s government is one of the longest-running conflicts in the world and 
has been fought over the past 52 years. Hopes have been raised that fighting has come 
to an end with the signing of the final peace accord by FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño 
and current Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos on November 24th. The signing 
of this peace accord had been preceded by four years of negotiations in Havana, lasting 
from 2012 until 2016; covering various issues ranging from urgently needed land 
reforms to measures to put an end to illegal drug trafficking. Iván Márquez, the FARC’s 
top negotiator, states that “The battle with weapons ends and the battle of ideas begins” 
(Brodzinsky, 2016) with Londoño expressing the wish that “the word may be the only 
weapon of the Colombians”1 (Cárdenas Herrera, 2016).  
The conflict in Colombia has been characterised by high levels of complexity 
and gross human rights violations such as kidnapping, torture, massacres, sexual 
violence, mutilation, forceful recruitment, and making people ‘disappear’; which were 
committed by all parties involved in the country’s internal armed struggle. The 
Colombian conflict can be characterised by low intensity and long duration and cannot 
be reduced to a single cause such as a dispute over religion or ethnicity. Consequently, 
it is more appropriate to speak of the Colombian peace processes running parallel to 
each other and tending to different conflict causes respectively. More than five decades 
of conflict has taken its toll on the country: 6.3 million internally displaced persons or 
desterrados until 2015, more than 220 000 fatalities (80 per cent of which were 
civilians), 25 000 - 60 000 desaparecidos or ‘disappeared’ persons, the number of 
landmine victims being the third highest worldwide, 5000 extrajudicial killings carried 
out by military forces throughout the country and an overall 7.6 million people out of a 
population of 49 million who have registered themselves as victims (Maldonado, 2017, 
                                                     
1
 “Que la palabra sea la única arma de los colombianos” 
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McFee, 2016, Kurtenbach & Lutscher, 2015). Among the violent military clashes 
between the guerrilla, paramilitary, and state forces, the rural population living in 
remote areas characterised by a lack of state control, have borne the lion’s share of 
suffering inflicted on the civilian population. The war in Colombia, consequently, has 
been described as a “war through third parties, where opponents do not confront each 
other directly but instead attack the real or supposed social base of the enemy” 
(González, 2004, p.15).          
 The role violence plays in the Colombian conflict therefore cannot be overstated 
and the current conflict cannot be understood without establishing the link between 
violence and economic interests “The economic and political elites have used 
displacement to ‘homogenise’ the population in a given area [...] People are not 
displaced ‘by violence’; rather, violence is the tool used to expel the population. The 
true causes for displacement are hidden behind the violence” including “control of 
production and extraction activities (of natural resources and minerals), mega-projects, 
expanding of stockbreeding estates and agricultural industry, control of illicit crops etc.” 
(González Bustilo as cited in Selfa, 2005, pp.20-1). Adapting Von Clausewitz he 
concludes that in the Colombian context “war is the continuation of economics through 
other means” (ibid). In this context, however, it is important to note that gender often 
tends to be rendered invisible in statistics.  Not to gender-disaggregate data makes 
“inequities invisible. Once you make inequities visible, you are also likely to make 
visible the power dynamics that create those inequities [...] Incuriositiy is a political act” 
(Enloe, C. as cited in Puechguirbal, 2010, p.174).     
 Breaking these figures up into the different categories of men and women 
exemplifies how the conflict has a varying impact on the sexes. Whereas 95 per cent of 
persons killed and injured by landmines during the fighting were male, out of the 
internally displaced people 78 per cent were women and children, with women suffering 
significantly more from conflict-related sexual violence (Bouvier, 2016). A balance 
between finding peace and satisfyingly addressing transitional justice (TJ) demands of 
the victims needs to be struck. Colombian President Santos (2014) notes that “many 
will wonder: why is this [peace in Colombia] important for Europe or for the world?” 
He goes on to answer by pointing out that Colombia “will be the first country to 
negotiate the end of an armed conflict within the Rome Statute. What happens in 
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Colombia will have profound implications for future conflict resolution anywhere in the 
world” (Santos, 2014). 
Despite the fact that during the fighting women suffer disproportionately from 
displacement and sexual violence, conflict might also constitute a window of 
opportunity for them to break free from traditional societal constraints based on 
gendered power hierarchies when traditional notions of masculinity and femininity are 
being overturned on the battlefield as well as behind the front lines. The core difficulty 
then lies with preserving these accomplishments once the fighting has come to an end. 
The women caught up in the war between Colombia’s government and armed 
insurgents belonged both to the most marginalised groups and featured highly among 
the fighters themselves. The FARC is composed of about 8,000 combatants out of 
whom an estimated 40 percent are female (O’Neill, 2015). Moreover, as the FARC 
fights under a banner of social justice, issues of gender equality have formed an integral 
part of the armed group’s strategy; albeit a contradictory one. While on the one hand 
openly opposing, for instance  domestic violence and abuse of women and children 
(with the penalty for raping someone in FARC controlled territory being execution), the 
group on the other hand also profited from a strong presence of machismo in Colombian 
society, targeting especially young and vulnerable girls in their recruitment process 
(Mazurana & Eckerbom Cole, 2013). In his speech to the Colombian people, Londoño 
explicitly mentioned women’s organisations as playing an integral part in the peace 
process and acknowledged the different forms their political activism takes (TV Perú 
Noticias, 2016). With plans of transforming the FARC into a political party in the post-
conflict phase, it remains to be seen to what extent this party could tap the potential of 
women’s issues and rights in order to gain electoral support.    
Historically, women have either been neglected in peace processes and the 
drafting of peace agreements or their role has been reduced to the one of the victims in 
need of protection. In order to tackle this simplification of the contributions women are 
making to conflicts and conflict resolution and to recognise them as essential agents in 
creating a lasting peace, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has passed 
several Resolutions since the year 2000. Ever since UNSC Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 
1325) on Women, Peace and Security of the year 2000, international actors’ attention 
has been drawn to the fact that conflict has a different impact on women than men. 
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Acknowledging that women, and their unique experiences as well as the contributions 
they could make to conflict resolution, had largely been neglected over the past, the 
resolution is considered a milestone with regard to promoting women’s rights. Together 
with its seven follow ups it constitutes what is termed the UN’s Women, Peace, and 
Security (WPS) framework aimed at supporting women in conflict and peace building 
processes. These resolutions, while heralded as milestones, have also evoked substantial 
criticism mainly with regard to their effectiveness. Problems with the successful 
implementation of Resolution 1325 entail “the lack of political commitment at the 
highest levels; the lack of strong systematic empirical evidence to infuse policy and 
inform best practices; and the lack of integration into mainstream international relations 
and security studies” (de Jonge Oudraat, 2013, p.615).    
Currently, the UN is present on the ground in Colombia with 509 members to a 
ceasefire observer mission in what former UN Secretary General (UNSG) Ban Ki Moon 
has termed an “unprecedented experience” (UN News Centre, 2016) as both main 
parties to the conflict jointly requested UN support in monitoring the disarmament 
process. With regard to the role women play in the Colombian peace process, the former 
UNSG, moreover, highlighted the active participation of women in the Colombian 
peace talks resulting in a final peace accord sensitive to issues of gender equality 
visualising “a peace which guarantees the participation of women in a future in which 
the possibility for everyone to participate in politics exists and in which there will be no 
space for politics based on violence”2 (El Tiempo, 2016, UN Mission 2016). Moreover, 
upon the request of Colombian Foreign Minister María Ángela Holguín, the UNSC 
agreed to continue the UN’s work in Colombia in the form of a new mission after the 
current one has fulfilled its mandate of observing the disarmament of the FARC. This 
new mission will consist of civilian observers only and will see a reduction in numbers; 
its purpose the facilitation of the successful implementation of the peace accord 
(Redacción Paz, 2017).         
 However, the need to further scrutinise the WPS framework’s shortcomings 
persists in order to determine to what extent it can be considered a useful tool to 
enhance women’s participation in situations of conflict and conflict resolution. This 
need relates not only to the practical side of the UN framework’s implementation 
                                                     
2
 “una paz que valora y garantiza la participación de la mujer en un futuro en el que existe la posibilidad 
de que todos puedan participar en política, ya que no habrá espacio para una política basada en violencia” 
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process but also requires to take a closer look at the lack of scholarly attention dedicated 
to issues of gender in the fields of International Relations in general and of conflict 
studies in particular. The end of the armed conflict between the Colombian state and the 
FARC marks a historic moment. Moreover, the high share of women involved in the 
conflict as fighters and victims as well as their contributions to the peace process are 
remarkable, making the Colombian case a relevant and up-to-date topic to study. As 
stated by President Santos, the Colombian example will have an impact on future peace 
processes in other parts of the world, in which the UN is also likely to be involved. As 
enhancing women’s participation in every stage of the peace process is one of the UN’s 
key priorities, the need to understand in more detail how the WPS agenda works ‘on the 
ground’ with regard to its implementation is crucial. Out of these needs the following 
research question evolves: to what extent does the Colombian peace process reflect the 
UN’s WPS framework?  
The main argument of this thesis is that the Colombian case can be considered 
relatively successful in including women in the peace process as envisioned in the WPS 
framework. The potential and importance of their active involvement in the peace 
process has been acknowledged at the highest political level and their demands to a 
noteworthy extent included in the final peace accord between the Santos government 
and the FARC. Nonetheless, this thesis also comes to the conclusion that this high level 
involvement of women in the official peace talks can be considered largely the result of 
external pressure exercised by the UN on the negotiating parties. An additional finding 
of this thesis is that the attention dedicated to different parts of the WPS framework is 
unbalanced and while certain areas are covered to an acceptable extent, others remain 
more or less neglected. Finally, the significant gap between theory and practice 
complicate the successful implementation of the WPS agenda in Colombia.   
The structure of this thesis proceeds as follows. The first part sets out the 
theoretical background against which the single case study of the current Colombian 
peace process is analysed. It reviews the literature on women in conflict and further 
discusses the concepts of ‘women’ and ‘post-conflict’ thereby setting the scene to 
situate UN-led efforts to introduce a gender perspective to conflict resolution and peace 
building. Subsequently, the next section analyses in greater detail the eight UNSCRs 
passed in the time period from 2000 to 2015. The resulting WPS framework  constitutes 
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the backdrop against which the different components of the current Colombian peace 
process are analysed. The fourth section gives a brief historical overview of the 
Colombian internal armed struggle and the various actors involved in the conflict. The 
fifth section draws upon a set of indicators directly derived from the eight WPS 
Resolutions and aims to find out to what extent the final peace accord between the 
Santos government and the FARC as well as some of the resulting Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) and TJ measures reflect the aims envisioned 
in the UN’s WPS framework. The final section concludes with a summary of the 
findings.   
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2. Theoretical Framework: Women in Conflict and Peace Building  
2.1 Women and Conflict: The Gendered Nature of Peace Building Processes 
The theoretical background for this thesis lies with a feminist approach to conflict 
theory which serves to investigate on the issue of women’s roles in conflict settlement 
and resolution. Martha Thompson (2006) finds that the issue of gender is not linked 
explicitly enough to current debates of conflict theory. She states that “new theories of 
conflict have so far failed to bring to light the different ways in which such conflict 
affects the roles of men and women, or the relationships and power balance between 
them” (p.344). The contribution of feminist approaches to the field of International 
Relations (IR) is to introduce a gender perspective to the discipline. This serves to 
critically analyse how different key concepts used in IR theories, such as the ‘state’ or 
‘sovereignty’, are themselves gendered, as well as how this “gendering of concepts” 
(Smith & Owens, 2008, p.181) has a different effect on women than on men. These 
approaches look at “how gender both affects world politics and is an effect of world 
politics” (ibid). Reimagining security from a feminist perspective, as envisioned by Ann 
Tickner (1992), therefore entails bringing to light “the hierarchical social relations, 
including gender relations, that have been hidden by realism’s frequently depersonalised 
discourse” in order to account for “the multiple experiences of both women and men” 
(p.66).       
The term gender therefore can be understood as the “social construction of 
difference between ‘men’ and ‘women’” (Smith & Owens, 2008, p.181). The term ‘sex’ 
usually refers to the biological differences between people thereby categorising them 
either as men or women. Gender, on the other hand, attaches to this differentiation 
based on biological factors, certain expectations on how an individual identified as a 
man or woman is supposed to behave: “Gender can be defined as a set of socially 
constructed ideas about what men and women ought to be [...] Gender characteristics 
are cultural creations passed on through socialisation” (Detraz, 2012, p.3). This 
construction of difference happens in everyday interactions and social processes and 
constitutes an underlying cause of inequality since “as long as women and men see 
themselves as different kinds of people, then women will be unlikely to compare their 
life options to those of men. Therein lies the power of gender” (Risman, 2004, p.432). 
Gender, according to Barbara Risman (2004), can be portrayed as a “social structure” to 
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be situated at the same level of analysis as politics and economics; fields equally 
characterised by structures. Risman justifies this argument by explaining that “race, 
gender, and sexuality are equally fundamental to human societies as the economy and 
the polity” as they are “fundamentally embedded throughout social life, at the level of 
individual identities, cultural expectations embedded into interactions, and institutional 
opportunities and constraints” (p.444). Nonetheless, the use of the term ‘gender’ is at 
times ambiguous and too often policy makers relate it to women’s issues only instead of 
bearing in mind the relational nature of the concept. Her observation of intersectionality, 
moreover, is crucial. How inequalities and gender identities are constructed varies 
considerably over time and space. Gender therefore always needs to be analysed in 
relation to other inequalities and cannot be examined in isolation as “to do otherwise 
presumes the whiteness of women, the maleness of people of colour, and the 
heterosexuality of everyone” (p.442).      
Similar to other critical studies, feminist analyses of world politics often carry 
with them a call for action, challenging what is being overlooked or taken for granted, 
and ultimately transforming society by exposing how “gender is, at its heart, a structural 
power relation” which “rests upon a central set of distinctions between different 
categories of people, valorises some over others, and organises access to resources, 
rights, responsibilities, authority, and life options, along the lines demarcating these 
groups” (Cohn, 2013, p.4). Gender inequality thereby is anchored in these power 
relations and can be understood as an uneven access to power and resources which 
favours men over women. Consequently, “academic feminism has ethical 
responsibilities that reflect an ontological understanding of scholarship as for social 
change” (Ackerly, 2008, p.30, original emphasis). In this context, gender mainstreaming 
can be understood as the official strategy to achieve gender equality. There needs to be, 
nevertheless, a distinction made between gender balancing and gender mainstreaming 
approaches to policy making. While the former aims at “increasing the number of 
women in a given role, in a way that approaches parity”, the latter follows the idea of 
“integrating a gender perspective into the activities of an organisation, thereby 
institutionalizing an understanding of the myriad ways in which gender matters” (Kirby 
& Shepherd, 2016, p.376).        
 Moreover, women might face opposition to their active participation in peace 
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processes. The question of why women should be represented at the negotiation table at 
all if they neither constituted the majority of the soldiers nor had an official political 
presence to begin with during pre-conflict times might be raised. Furthermore, once 
accepted to the negotiation table, women, see their capabilities to contribute effectively 
questioned disproportionately when compared to their male counterparts. Women’s 
participation is often considered unnecessary or unnatural either due to the fact that it 
runs against so called traditional values of their respective society or, on the contrary, 
women’s interests are declared not differing from the male ones and therefore already 
adequately represented by male negotiators. However, “if peace agreements are written, 
accorded, and implemented solely by men, the gender dynamics that were present 
throughout the armed conflict will remain unquestioned and intact” (de Alwis, Mertus 
& Sajjad, 2013, p.192).       
There always needs to be an explanation as to why to include women. Their 
eventual inclusion then tends to be justified either because of their supposedly more 
peaceful nature as mothers and caretakers, or because they have been disproportionately 
victimised by the war and therefore require special protection. Without downplaying the 
substantial suffering endured by women in conflict-torn societies, this thesis follows the 
notion, according to which, “Women should participate in peace processes not because 
they are innately peaceful or they have been victimized by wars, but because they are 
themselves political subjects with rights” (ibid). Additionally, the stronger the 
influence of women on the process, the more likely it is for an agreement to be reached 
and the following peace accord to be implemented (Paffenholz et al, 2016). The 
influence exercised by women on the process either as individuals or acting collectively 
in women’s organisations, can be defined as “their ability to push for their preferences 
before, during, and after the negotiation process” with their preferences encompassing 
topics as varied as “bringing issues onto the negotiation and implementation agenda; 
putting issues into the substance of the agreement; taking part in the implementation of 
an agreement; the demand for negotiations to begin, for negotiations to  resume, or for 
an agreement to be signed” (Paffenholz et al, 2016, p.16). In this context, “peace 
processes that included women as witnesses, signatories, mediators, and/or negotiators 
demonstrated a 20 per cent increase in the probability of a peace agreement lasting at 
least two years” (UN Global Study, 2015, p.41). Moreover, it is crucial to involve 
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women as early as possible in the peace process as this significantly facilitates their 
further involvement in the negotiations and therefore increases the likelihood for them 
to make their demands heard throughout the talks.  
Apart from criticising the manner in which matters of advancing women’s rights 
and gender equality are addressed in international peacemaking operations and liberal 
peace building efforts, some authors (Hudson, 2012, Aroussi, 2011, Cook, 2009, 
Cockburn, 2007) also seek to draw attention to the anti-militarist endeavours of the 
feminist project. They question a militarist approach all together by pointing out its 
inherently male structures and the resulting power imbalances. Granting women a voice 
in peace negotiations or participation in designing the institutions of their country’s 
post-conflict society “does nothing to address war as an institution in itself” nor does it 
“challenge the dominant rules and practices of international institutions” (Hudson, 
2012, p.450). This also affects many of the proposals with regard to conflict-related 
sexual violence. In this context, co-drafter of UNSCR 1325 Cora Weiss (2011) notes 
that “We cannot pluck rape out of war and let the war go on. We must not make war 
safe for women. It is time to abolish war”. These authors conclude that little has been 
achieved in order to tangibly improve women’s daily struggles living in post-conflict 
societies. Furthermore, attention needs to be drawn to the concepts of ‘women’ and 
‘post-conflict’ two core concepts with regard to this thesis, which are discussed in 
greater detail in the following two 
sections.                                                                                     
2.2 Breaking down the Concept of ‘Women’: Conflict as a Window of Opportunity 
Conflicts do not only differ in their impact on men as opposed to women but women’s 
experiences might also differ greatly from each other and depend on factors such as 
ethnicity, social status, and religion: “Applying these insights helps us see the political, 
social, and economic processes of normalization that sustain hierarchies. All sorts of 
values, practices, norms, and institutions impede, exclude, ignore, or marginalize some 
women, but not all women, nor only women” (Ackerly, 2008, p.40). Moreover, the 
notion that women should be included in peace building efforts based on their natural 
proneness to being more peaceful and compromise seeking, due to their functions as 
mothers and care takers, remains persistent and has become an integral part of the 
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international discourse on women as peacemakers. There have been instances in which 
women have made active use of their role as mothers in order to make their demands 
heard among their respective societies; one example of this being the Association of 
War Affected Women in Sri Lanka with the aim of “unit[ing] women from both sides of 
the divide around their shared status as mothers, sisters and wives of servicemen, and 
seek[ing] to foster an identity as women that will transcend their ethnic affiliations” 
(Peace Direct, 2016). In the Colombian context, the motto of women’s rights movement 
La Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres (Ruta Pacífica) for instance is “women will not bear 
sons and daughters for war”3 which also refers to women primarily as mothers resisting 
war led efforts in order to keep their (future) children safe. While this form of activism 
called maternalism has proven to be a powerful tool in acknowledging women’s voices 
during times of conflict, feminist scholars have raised concern that this approach ends 
up reinforcing militarised masculinities as well as the notion of a femininity of peace. 
Moreover, as Cynthia Cockburn (2007) notes, women evoking the argument of 
maternalism “instead of speaking for themselves as autonomous women [...] seem to be 
reducing themselves to nothing-but-mothers, to a biological function and a stereotypical 
role, thereby reinforcing what society already imposes” (pp.209-10).  
In the patriarchal system which governs most states and their institutions, 
everything and everyone associated with feminine traits is considered subordinate to the 
prevailing ‘hegemonic masculinity’; a term introduced by R.W. Connell (1995) in his 
‘social theory of gender’. This concerns first and foremost women but also men who do 
not live up to the expectations connected to the hegemonic masculinity of the society 
they are living in. It is important to note that hegemonic masculinity has no inherent 
traits as such but is a relational concept and “is upheld by its dynamic relation with 
subordinated masculinities, most notably homosexual masculinity” (Budgeon, 2014, 
p.322). What exactly constitutes the hegemonic masculinity at any given point in time 
or place may be subject to change and is to be understood as “the masculinity that 
occupies the hegemonic position in a given pattern of gender relations, a position 
always contestable” (Connell, 1995, p.76). Different masculinities and femininities 
interact with each other on the societal playing field thereby producing the type of 
masculinity considered hegemonic and most desirable, “their making and remaking [of 
                                                     
3
 “Las mujeres no parimos hijos e hijas para la guerra” 
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masculinities] is a political process affecting the balance of interests in society and the 
direction of social change” (Connell, 1995, p.44). In the case of Colombia, hegemonic 
masculinity clearly is of a militarised nature. Militarised masculinities are constructed 
by different entities engaging in combat or designed to defend, be it a state’s military or 
some type of non-state armed actor, and can be described as the “fusion of certain 
practices and images of maleness with the use of weapons, the exercise of violence, and 
the performance of an aggressive and frequently misogynist masculinity” (Theidon, 
2009, p.5). Reward and repetition ensure the recruits’ commitment thereby training 
them to become “violent enough to kill if asked” while remaining “willing to 
subordinate themselves to hierarchy and authority” (Detraz, 2012, pp.30-31).   
 When asked why they joined an armed group, be it the guerrilla or the 
paramilitaries, Colombian ex-combatants are often cited not having had promising 
alternatives in their search for respect, security for themselves and their families, or a 
basic income: “In the complex scenario of violence that characterizes Colombia, cycling 
through an armed group is a rite of passage for many young men. In a context of 
generalized violence, the proliferation of criminal networks, a limited legal labor 
market, and a cultural economy that fuses weapons, masculinity, and power, grabbing a 
gun is not necessarily an aberration” (Theidon, 2009, pp.16-17). The fact that many 
recruits are still minors at their point of entry further exacerbates the notion of joining 
an armed group as a rite of passage. Joining the paramilitaries, for instance, while being 
one of the few viable options to survive in a region of Colombia where state control is 
completely absent, furthermore, allowed the young recruits to “feel like a big man in the 
streets of their barrios [...] to go out with the prettiest young women and to dress well” 
(ibid). Consequently, the process of DDR and handing over one’s weapon, particularly 
in a scenario in which the state is not considered trustworthy or capable of ensuring the 
individual’s safety and physical integrity, can feel emasculating. Often, this feeling of 
loss of power is getting transmitted into the returning recruits’ households in the form of 
domestic violence under which women tend to suffer most.          
 In addition to that, the common depiction of women’s bodies as representing the 
nation or the homeland in need of protection from the enemy is what gives a great part 
of conflict-related violence meaning. At the same time it endangers women further as 
degrading them is getting equalled with discrediting the opponent who was not strong 
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enough to provide adequate protection for the vulnerable parts of his population. 
Consequently, sexual violence becomes a war strategy aimed at taking away the 
enemy’s will to fight as well as a means of terror to forcefully displace populations 
when confronted with the threat of mass rapes which count as tactics of ethnic cleansing 
and genocide “Women and their bodies are seen as the repository and reproducers of 
national, racial, ethnic, tribal, or religious identity – they are the vessels through which 
men [...] can (re)produce new members of the group; thus their bodies are the territory 
over which men must have control in order to assure the continuation of their national 
identities, bloodlines, and their familial and national honor” (Cohn, 2013, p.14).  
In summary of the points outlined above, Hilary Charlesworth (2008) identifies 
‘four orthodoxies’ which have gained prominence in the discourse on women and 
conflict. Firstly, “an assumption that women are better than men at developing and 
sustaining peace” secondly, “a tendency to assert that women are more vulnerable than 
men” often exemplified by the prominent practice to reduce “women and children” to 
one single category of victims (p.351). The third orthodoxy refers to the frequent 
reference in international legal documents to “the need to include women in formal 
peace negotiations” (ibid) without, however, sufficiently explaining what this need is 
based on; the fact that women are inherently more peaceful than men and therefore 
predisposed to achieving a sustainable and durable peace or because of their equality in 
rights to participate in these negotiations. Charlesworth suggests the former. Lastly she 
raises a point which has attracted substantial criticism throughout other works of the 
literature on women and conflict as well (Aroussi, 2011, Theidon, 2009) namely that 
“the use of the term ‘gender’” usually is meant “to refer only to women” (Charlesworth, 
2008, p.351) therefore “making gender-based violence synonymous with sexual 
violence against women”(Aroussi, 2011, p.588).      
 This thesis adopts a similar standpoint, according to which the failure to clearly 
define what exactly constitutes women’s ‘participation’ and the ‘need’ to include them 
in peace negotiations, obstructs successful implementation of the WPS agenda. 
Moreover, this thesis comes to a similar conclusion as outlined above, according to 
which the common neglect of the relational nature of the concept of ‘gender’ constitutes 
a core hindrance to designing post-conflict strategies which will result in a sustainable 
peace.           
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 The reason why conflict constitutes a window of opportunity for women lies in 
its potential to overturn traditional masculinities and femininities along the battle lines 
as well as at home when both men and women are required to take up roles and tasks 
not traditionally associated with their gender. Due to the changes in society deriving 
from the conflict, some women are able to record gains in the social, political, and 
economic sphere (Meintjes, Pillay & Turshen, 2003). The difficulties of preserving the 
gains made by women during conflict times in the aftermath of the conflict are 
described in the subsequent section.  
2.3 Breaking down the Concept of ‘Post-Conflict’: Women and the Danger of 
‘Backlash’ 
What exactly constitutes a post-conflict society is contested. Measures such as signing 
ceasefire agreements for example do not automatically lead to a post-conflict society. 
Nonetheless, countries are usually considered post-conflict when a peace agreement has 
been signed, and the armed fighting has ceased. The concept of ‘post-conflict’ can be 
criticised due to its vagueness and ambivalence to the different experiences of women 
and men during this time. Additionally, it can be described as “an excuse for the main 
development agencies and international powers to devote fewer resources to the 
amelioration of complex political emergencies [...] and to allow structural adjustment 
policies to reign as usual [...] To label war as peace is not only Orwellian, but also it 
justifies implementing shock therapy to create the market cure for war” (Moore, 2000, 
p.13). Subsequently, with regard to this thesis’ main research endeavour, the question 
needs to be asked: what does a post-conflict situation look like for women in particular? 
 Structuring their analysis along the lines of a similar question Sheila Meintjes, 
Anu Pillay and Meredeth Turshen (2003) come to the conclusion that there “is no 
aftermath for women” observing instead that “the transition from war to peace, or from 
military dictatorship to democracy, the rhetoric of equality and rights tends to mask the 
reconstruction of patriarchal power, despite recent emphasis on women's human rights” 
(p.4). Most likely the environment in which women find themselves after the fighting 
has stopped is characterised by tension. On the one hand, the desire of returning to a 
stability associated with pre-conflict times and the traditional gender roles associated 
with this time period exists. This desire, on the other hand, then clashes with the will to 
interlock the gains and progress made during times of conflict with the newly emerging 
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post-conflict architecture of a country’s societal setup. Ruth Jacobson (2013), therefore 
introduces the term “post-combat” in order to draw attention to the fact that there are 
many regions in the world which are “not ‘technically’ at war” but “are marked by 
levels of deaths and casualties that invoke the same terminology” (p.215, original 
emphasis). Raising awareness of the social and economic inequalities among other 
threats such as environmental destruction and poverty which continue to persist within 
and among numerous regions in the world she warns that “we must, at least, be wary of 
claims that ‘conflict’ is a thing of the past in any state” (ibid).  
During peace building processes, discourses and practices promoted by 
international institutions such as the UN, contribute to reinforcing and reproducing 
gendered power relations. The reasons to include or exclude the issue of women and 
‘doing gender’ in operations of liberal peacebuilding are manifold and deeply 
politicised. As Heidi Hudson (2012) observes, “keeping women out, or SGBV [sexual 
gender-based violence] off the table often serves a pragmatic [...] purpose - ensuring 
that the peace agreement between elites proceeds unhindered” (p.445). In a similar vein, 
Sabine Kurtenbach (2012) criticises so called ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ enabling peace 
by granting amnesty to the militarily defeated parties. However, she also notes that due 
to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) under the Rome Statute 
in 2002, this issue is not exclusively to be dealt with domestically anymore but can be 
brought into the spotlight of the international arena with the potential of challenging 
before international law amnesty arrangements made at the national level. This bears 
both the opportunity for victims to experience some sort of compensation as well as the 
threat to render the conclusion of final peace agreements more problematic as insurgent 
fighters are less likely to make concessions if they face long sentences in jail. From the 
point of view of the survivors of sexual violence, Colombia’s subjugation to the ICC is 
paramount as the Rome Statute is the first international judicial tool “to consider as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity sexual and gender-based crimes - including 
persecution based on gender, as well as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other forms of sexual violence” (Bouvier, 
2016, p.12).   
Over the course of Colombia’s history, moreover, a number of laws have been 
passed in order to address problems of gender inequality and violence against women. 
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Some laws focus on participation and establish quotas to guarantee women’s 
representation in public institutions and political parties (Law 581, 2000 & Law 1475, 
2011) or gender equality more generally (Law 1257, 2008). Others have at their core the 
aim of erasing violence against women and girls (Law 248, 1997, Law 679, 2001), 
thereby acknowledging the particular vulnerability of displaced women (Order 092, 
2008) and rural women (Law 731, 2002) (AMOR, 2014, ABColombia, 2013). One law 
in particular is worth noting at this point, namely law 1761 of the year 2015 or better 
known as the Law Rosa Elvira Cely: a law against femicide. According to the WHO, 
femicide can be defined as the “intentional murder of women” which “is usually 
perpetrated by men” (WHO, 2012, p.1). Moreover, femicide is said to differ “from male 
homicide in specific ways” as “most cases of femicide are committed by partners or ex-
partners, and involve ongoing abuse in the home, threats or intimidation, sexual 
violence or situations where women have less power or fewer resources than their 
partner” (ibid). Consequently, a great number of femicides could be prevented by 
intervening early enough. According to Colombian women’s rights organisation Sisma 
Mujer, in Colombia every eleven minutes a woman is being attacked by her partner or 
ex-partner, one in thirty is a victim of sexual violence and every three days a woman is 
being murdered: “The aggressions, sexual violence and femicides in a society as macho 
as the Colombian one is a silent war which, moreover, is accompanied by high levels of 
impunity”4 (Sulé, 2014d, original emphasis). Sexual violence as a strategy of war 
turning women’s bodies into a battlefield has been employed by state, guerrilla, and 
paramilitary forces with the latter, however, accounting by far for the greatest number 
of human rights violations (Bouvier, 2016, Sulé, 2014a, ABColombia, 2013).  
Femicide rates in Colombia increased by 22 per cent in 2016 when compared to 
2015. Sexual violence rates also saw an increase by seven per cent, making Colombia 
one of the countries with the highest femicide rates worldwide (El Tiempo, 2017). 
Furthermore, certain segments of the population constitute the majority of victims of 
these crimes and the impunity that regularly accompanies them. Indigenous, queer, 
lesbian, and Afro-Colombian women suffer substantially more from these crimes 
showing once more how inequalities intersect and reinforce each other (Werner, 2017). 
The roots of the alarmingly high number of femicides are to be found in the macho 
                                                     
4
 “Las agresiones, la violencia sexual y los feminicidios en una sociedad tan machista como la 
colombiana es una guerra silenciosa que va además acompañada de altos niveles de impunidad” 
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foundation of Colombian society and the domination of a hegemonic masculinity 
characterized by militarization. Machismo as defined by the Oxford Dictionary counts 
as “aggressive male behaviour that emphasises the importance of being strong”. This 
type of behaviour undoubtedly characterises Colombian society and constitutes the 
main source of insecurity for Colombian women; that “we have opened the door of the 
home [...] [is] still inacceptable for many men”5 in a Colombia where “the expression 
‘gender justice’ still sounds unwonted”6 (Thomas, 2017). 
While welcoming the attention drawn to these issues, women’s rights 
organisation Casa de la Mujer criticises the over proportional focus on punishment by 
judicial means to combat the problem of violence against women instead of putting an 
emphasis on the possible ways of preventing this kind of behaviour. Moreover, even 
where suitable laws exist, law enforcement agencies at times are not aware of their 
existence or question the necessity of “filling [...] prisons with men who only saw ‘their 
hand slip’”7(Casmujer, 2013, p.12). Furthermore, personnel responsible for applying 
these laws might not be sensitised sufficiently to the special circumstances and realities 
of female victims of the conflict. Consequently, the danger exists that measures 
designed to help women can indeed lead to a re-victimisation of the ones who had been 
seeking protection therefore further deteriorating women’s trust in the judicial system as 
a credible way to achieve justice (Casmujer, 2012).  
Despite the progress women’s rights have made on paper in Colombia, many 
issues remain to be addressed in order to guarantee women’s physical and emotional 
integrity. The ongoing conflict with the militarised masculinities it reproduces further 
exacerbates this problem. Women’s rights organisations criticise the discrepancy 
between what is stated on paper and what is happening in women’s daily lives when 
confronted with the challenges of violence and marginalisation, “multiple forms of 
discrimination, exclusion and aggression [...] installed, since infancy, in both men and 
women to show us how we have to be like and behave [...] associating a good example 
[of a woman] with silence”8 (Reyes, 2017).        
                                                     
5
 “hemos abierto la puerta de la casa [...] aún inaceptable para muchos hombres” 
6
 “la expresión ‘justicia de género’ suena todavía como insólita” 
7
 “llenar los [...] carcelarios con hombres ‘a los que se les fue la mano’” 
8
 “múltiples formas de discriminación, de exclusión y de aggression [...] instaladas desde la infancia, igual 
en hombres y mujeres, para mostrarnos cómo debemos ser y comportarnos [...] asocie buen ejemplo con 
silencio” 
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2.4 The UNSCR 1325 Framework on Women, Peace and Security  
Taking the time period of the years 1992 to 2011, out of the chief mediators of peace 
processes only two per cent were women, with female negotiators in peace processes 
constituting just nine per cent (O’Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin &, Paffenholz, 2015). In a 
similar manner, UN Women (n.d.) observes that “out of 585 peace agreements from 
1990 to 2010, only 92 contained any references to women. In 2013, more than half of 
all peace agreements signed included references to women, peace and security. From 
1992 to 2011, fewer than four per cent of signatories to peace agreements [...] were 
women”. Analysing explicit references to women and gender in peace agreements from 
1990 to 2010, Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke (2010) see a positive role played 
by the UN, as the references to women and gender have increased after the passing of 
UNSCR 1325, and are more likely to be found among the agreements to end conflicts in 
which the UN was involved as a third party. This, however, does not necessarily lead to 
an actual improvement in women’s lives as the realisation that greater gender equality is 
beneficial to a society cannot be imposed from above, but has to be rooted in the society 
itself. 
In order to recognise women as essential agents in creating a lasting peace, the 
UNSC has passed several Resolutions since the year 2000. Ever since UNSCR 1325 on 
Women, Peace, and Security of the year 2000, international actors’ attention has been 
drawn to the fact that the impact of conflict differs for women and men. Acknowledging 
that women, and their unique experiences as well as the contributions they could make 
to conflict resolution, had largely been neglected over the past, the Resolution is 
considered a milestone with regard to promoting women’s rights. UNSCR 1325 
therefore “Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all 
decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and 
mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict”. This 
Resolution, moreover, is considered to lay the foundations for the WPS agenda, the 
overall policy architecture of which, is comprised of eight Resolutions in total: UNSCR 
1325 (2000), UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009), UNSCR 1889 (2009), 
UNSCR 1960 (2010), UNSCR 2106 (2013), UNSCR 2122 (2013), and UNSCR 2242 
(2015).   
The four central themes, or pillars, characterising the current WPS agenda 
deriving from UNSCR 1325 are: prevention, participation, protection, relief and 
recovery. These pillars acknowledged as being “pertinent to matters of international 
peace and security” (George & Shepherd, 2016, p.298) deal with the following: 
“participation, addressing the pressing issues of women’s political leadership in peace 
and security governance; prevention, focusing on strategies to combat violence; 
protection, of both the rights and bodies of women; and relief and recovery for conflict 
survivors, particularly survivors of sexualised violence in conflict” (ibid). The term 
sexual violence is used to describe forms of both physical and psychological violence 
with sexuality being the means or target of an act of violence. In the context of conflict, 
“conflict-related sexual violence refers to ‘rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization and other forms of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is linked, 
directly or indirectly (temporally, geographically or causally) to a conflict’” (Bouvier, 
2016, p.9). Out of the resolutions mentioned above, UNSCR 2242 was passed after the 
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 anniversary of UNSCR 1325, and comes closest to the issues originally covered in 
UNSCR 1325 which means it is relatively balanced between the different pillars. 
Excluding UNSCRs 1325 and 2242, however, the picture is more skewed towards 
addressing issues related to depicting women as victims of conflict-related sexual 
violence in need of protection: “Only Resolutions 1889 and 2122 focus primarily on 
participation issues, while four of the remaining WPS resolutions address violence 
prevention and protection (Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106)” (Kirby & 
Shepherd, 2016, p.380).   
 
Figure 1. Overview of WPS Pillars. 
Pillar I → Participation 
Pillar II → Prevention 
Pillar III → Protection 
Pillar IV → Relief and Recovery 
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Figure 2. Overview of the WPS Framework. 
 
Strand I: Participation and Representation  
Generally speaking, UNSCR 1325 can be welcomed as a tool to support women’s 
agency in peace building processes by seeking to advance their participation and 
representation in peace processes. Sheri Gibbings (2011), singles out three arguments 
central to 1325; increase the “participation of women in various bodies, institutions and 
processes related broadly to peace and security” aim for “the incorporation of a gender 
perspective into all these processes and institutions” and establish “a mechanism 
through which the Security Council can take into account gender and the rights of 
women” (p.528). However, feminist scholarship is divided as to whether this Resolution 
and the WPS framework in general “represents a shift toward a more inclusive, gender-
sensitive, global governance, whether it undermines women’s grassroots struggles for 
justice and security or whether it is mere rhetoric that changes little in practice” (Pratt & 
Richter-Devroe, 2011, p.499). 1325, however, also contributes to the “depiction of 
unproblematized gender roles” and does little to critically challenge the “utopian 
assumptions that a female presence will result in positive change” (Hudson, 2012, 
p.450). Moreover, its “overemphasis on essentialist, stereotypical notions of women as 
victims or mothers underplays the role of women as political agents in conflict, and 
conversely masks the victimhood of men and boys” (ibid). Nicola Pratt (2013), 
furthermore, points out that “1325 privileges gender above race, class, or other 
significant relations of power in understanding women’s experiences and responses to 
conflict” and criticises “that while 1325 reconfigures the gendered binaries of 
international security, it does so by reinscribing racialized and sexualized hierarchies in 
the conceptualization and practice of international security” (pp.773-4) thereby failing 
• Participation and 
representation 
• 1325, 1889, 2122, 2242 Strand I 
• Prevention and 
protection 
• 1820, 1888, 1960, 2106 Strand II 
26 
 
to acknowledge the issue of intersectionality. UNSCR 1889’s main contribution is its 
call to develop a set of indicators in order to track the implementation of 1325 in order 
to face critiques with respect to the latter’s effectiveness. 
Criticism, has been directed at the official UN discourse and the “powerful 
norms” existent around the WPS agenda which is anchored in the UN’s “master 
narrative” which is expected to be “positive, hopeful and future oriented” in order to 
“mobilise a vision that enrols a number of different interests and masks any ideological 
differences [...] a vision wherein women are no longer abused and their contributions 
are recognised” and which “situate Resolution 1325 in relation to the UN’s historical 
goal to make the world a better place” (Gibbings, 2011, pp.526-8). This touches upon 
the issues of how women are being expected to act as peacemakers and of the role 
language plays in the process of reinforcing the image of women as peace-loving. In 
this context, the role of the UN as one of the most powerful international actors is 
paramount and while “one of the key ways that power is negotiated at the UN is through 
language [...] the UN discourses that are uplifting, positive and present women as 
peacemakers are the most valued” (ibid). Whereas the rights based approach, according 
to which women deserve to be included in peace processes based on the fact that they 
are holding the same human rights as men, is still to be found in speeches held at the 
UN, two supplementary discourses have emerged. The first, according to Gibbings, is 
the one referring to “special treatment rights” according to which “women and girls 
need to be paid attention because conflict affects them differently” and the one deriving 
its legitimacy from “contributor rights” according to which “women can make a 
difference when it comes to peace” (p.529). Consequently, women are marketed as a 
resource which can make a difference in a peace process due to their ability of linking 
the higher level of the UN with the grassroots in societies plagued by conflict.  
In order to make their concerns heard, NGOs and women’s rights advocates 
therefore had to adjust their language to the norms prevalent at the UN because “if 
language is power, then to use the same speech forms as the Security Council members” 
allowed the representatives of women’s rights NGOs “to situate themselves on a similar 
playing field as Member States” (Gibbings, 2011, p.532). This required for instance a 
rhetoric shift away from anti-militarism towards the “positive and uplifting language of 
the UN” and therefore “the route to peace and ending war in this approach was no 
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longer a reduction in military spending but the integration of women and a gender 
perspective; women were viewed and constructed as peacemakers, fitting with the more 
utopian visions circulating at the UN” (Gibbings, 2011, p.533). Consequently, some 
discourses carry more weight than others thereby silencing discourses which mismatch 
the predominant picture of women as peacemakers according to which “women are 
positioned as overcoming conflict as agents of the local, but simultaneously as having 
interests in universal good [...] expected to embody and reproduce this image as 
upholders of peace in their communities” (Gibbings, 2011, p.534).    
As opposed to past trends of the WPS agenda of shifting the focus more towards 
the issue of protecting women from conflict-related sexual violence (as discussed in the 
next sub-section), UNSCR 2122 is considered “radically different” (Shepherd, 2014, 
p.2) as it not only calls for UN-wide action including the UNSC itself to make the WPS 
criteria an integral part of its own agenda, but also due to the significant amount of 
attention it dedicates to the role of civil society organisations in advancing the WPS 
agenda.  
Strand II: Prevention and Protection    
UNSCR 1820 constitutes the second Resolution passed within the UN’s WPS 
framework, nine years after 1325, and the first one to address the issue of conflict-
related sexual violence. It was later followed by Resolutions 1888, 1960, and 2106. 
Briefly summarised, 1820 states that rape or other forms of sexual violence might, 
under certain circumstances, constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a 
constitutive act with respect to genocide. Most importantly, it calls for an end to 
impunity for these crimes, calls for an exclusion of this sort of crime from amnesty 
provisions, and explicitly establishes a link between sexual violence and women’s 
effective participation in matters of peace and security tackling the widespread notion of 
rape as “an unavoidable by product of war” (Goldenberg Goldstoff, 2010, p.491). 
 Similar to the Resolutions dealing with increasing women’s participation and 
representation in negotiations and peace processes, feminist scholars have criticised the 
second strand of Resolutions on grounds that the focus on sexual violence, while 
seeking to make women’s lives safer, bears the danger of further contributing to the 
image of women being weak and dependent on other people’s protection. Melissa 
Goldenberg Goldstoff (2010), deems Resolution 1820 “imperfect but necessary” in 
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order to “protect civilians from rape in war zones” (ibid), but she also criticises the fact 
that it “isolates the aspect of women as rape victims” despite the fact that “portraying 
women as the victim only weakens them in the eyes of men and potential rapists” 
(Goldenberg Goldstoff, 2010, p.514) therefore potentially victimising women instead of 
empowering them. Moreover, 1820 is flawed to the extent that it does not make clear 
what kind of punishment awaits the ones violating it.     
 When comparing both Resolutions 1820 and 1325, Hudson (2012) notes that 
“while UNSCR 1325 attempts to establish women’s agency – albeit a thin version – in 
peacebuilding processes, the narrow focus of UNSCR 1820 may vitiate UNSCR 1325, 
reinforce women’s victimhood, and largely exclude SGBV against men and boys [...] it 
follows that if women are cast as victims, the immediate effect is that the positive 
masculinity (protector) and negative masculinity (perpetrator) of men are reinforced” 
(p.450). Nonetheless, this thesis tends to support the approach brought forward by 
authors criticizing the dichotomy of women in conflict being either agents or victims. 
The fact that a woman has experienced sexual violence does not exempt her from being 
a powerful agent and advocate for change, “We should not focus so much on treating 
war as an opportunity for agency to the extent that we forget how horrific and 
unacceptable it is because of what it does to human beings. The victim-agent dichotomy 
also obscures the fact that the issues of participation and violence are inextricably 
linked” (Cook, 2009, p.128).       
 Similarly, Laura Shepherd (2011) argues against the notion of 1820 leading to 
the further victimization of women and sees the Resolution as well as its successor 
UNSCR 1888 as acknowledging women’s agency as they stress the need to have a 
strong female presence in formal peace processes as well as encourage an active 
participation in the security sector, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. 
This is also due to a discursive shift, according to which the phrase “women and 
children”, as a bone of contention in UNSCRs 1325 and 1820, has been replaced by the 
term “civilians” in 1888. Gina Heathcote’s (2012) criticism, furthermore, is directed at 
UNSCR 1960’s operative paragraph number three. She criticises the approach 
according to which the UNSG and UNSC engage in a “naming and shaming” process of 
non-state armed actors suspected of committing acts of sexual violence as a reaction to 
claims that accountability mechanisms were missing from 1325. Heathcote (2012) 
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criticises that “without a renewed Security Council effort to respond to the need for 
recognition and support of women’s participation at all stages of conflict resolution 
(including in the Council itself), the approach of resolution 1960 remains one that [...] 
denies the intersection of race, class and gender in contemporary institutional 
approaches, and that does little to encourage the participation of nonstate actors, 
particularly armed groups” (p.22). She concludes that its impact will be minimal at best 
and counterproductive to reducing the impunity of armed groups perpetrating sexual 
violence at worst.          
 With regard to the role of the UN in particular, Sahla  Aroussi (2011) notes that 
a “broad and holistic approach” is needed in order to secure women’s safety and 
participation which “necessarily entails a break from the traditionally militaristic and 
masculinised Security Council’s strategies of sanctions and punishments” (p.577). In 
order to do so, the UNSC is required to not only focus on justice in the sense of criminal 
prosecution and accountability, but to move the victims’ needs and desires to the centre 
stage of all questions related to achieving justice. It is about disrupting the link which 
exists between the “militaristic and masculinised perception of rape” and “equally 
masculinised and militaristic responses” according to which rape “becomes a masculine 
problem that can only be solved through masculine solutions of military discipline or 
threat of punishment from a masculinised state” (p.589).     
 While the various UNSCRs on which the WPS framework is based can indeed 
be criticised on several grounds, this thesis proceeds from the standpoint that despite 
their shortcomings, these Resolutions constitute an important stepping stone for 
women’s rights organisations and have significantly improved women’s bargaining 
positions in official peace processes. The main point of criticism in this regard is 
directed at the framework’s effectiveness in cases where there is no direct UN 
involvement as no tools exists to hold accountable states which fall short in including 
women in their peace processes.         
 Whereas the current section sought to illustrate the theoretical background of 
this thesis, the subsequent section introduces its analytical framework by further 
elaborating on the methodology and sources used in this study. It does so by shedding 
light on what it means to conduct qualitative research from a feminist perspective. 
Moreover, it describes in greater detail how the set of indicators, according to which the 
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analytical part is structured, have been derived. Additionally, the next section elaborates 
on this study’s contribution to the academic literature as well as its shortcomings and 
potential for further research. 
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3. Analytical Framework 
Feminist methodology is an emancipatory project aimed at upholding constant 
awareness of the power hierarchies underlying not only the dynamics of the study topic 
at hand, but also the process of academic research as such. Consequently, this approach 
to conducting research seeks to pay attention to issues of imbalance, inequality, and 
oppression unmasking certain actors and voices rendered silent. Their marginalisation 
often tends to be either made invisible or portrayed as being something natural or given. 
It is wrong, however, to assume that feminist research could only be conducted by 
women. It can be considered a tool aimed at making every step of one’s research more 
self-critical and self-aware, thereby enriching any kind of research by raising awareness 
of one’s own privilege and biases by adopting “a theoretical perspective with a 
methodological commitment to be attentive to privilege and hierarchy not only as a 
subject of study but also as a way of studying” (Ackerly, 2008, p.39). Consequently, 
“the point is not to identify a perspective to privilege, but to deploy a device that 
destabilizes the perspective from which we ‘know’” (ibid.). The question of power is at 
the very heart of every feminist inquiry and “is about revealing unquestioned 
differences and inequalities that conceal the exercise of power, including the power to 
conceal those differences and inequalities, and being attentive to the power exercised 
when researching these” (Ackerly, 2008, p.30).       
 In order to answer the research question as to what extent the WPS framework is 
reflected in the Colombian peace process between the Santos government and the 
FARC, this thesis puts an analytical focus on the final version of the peace agreement of 
November 2016. In order to assess compliance with the WPS framework, a set of 
indicators was derived from the operative paragraphs of all eight UNSCRs comprising 
the UN framework on WPS. Only the provisions which were also addressed at member 
states, as opposed to the ones exclusively directed for example at the SG, were included 
in the list of indicators to be applied to the final peace agreement. Certain provisions 
were mentioned multiple times in several of the Resolutions. In these cases, the most 
concrete formulation was included in the list of indicators. Moreover, provisions which 
were kept overly vague in the Resolutions were also excluded from the list of indicators 
as compliance with these would be difficult to measure satisfyingly. Subsequently, each 
indicator was then allocated to one of the four pillars constituting the WPS framework 
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(participation, prevention, protection, relief and recovery) in order to render compliance 
with the aims outlined in the framework measurable. While the main area of application 
of this set of indicators is the peace agreement, the analysis at times expands to include 
DDR and TJ measures. Consequently, the time period under investigation covers the 
entirety of the conflict in Colombia, however, an emphasis is put on the period from 
2012 until 2017, as this time period covers the complete Havana peace talks as well as 
the first months of the implementation phase.     
 With regard to the main source of this analysis, uncertainty persists on a number 
of aspects of peace agreements: their legal footing, and international effects, whether 
they confer legal capacity to non-state armed actors, and their relationship to 
international law. All these factors further complicate the implementation phase. On the 
outset, “peace agreements share a legal-looking structure” by making use of 
“preambles, sections, articles, and annexes. They also share legal-type language, 
speaking of parties, signatories, and binding obligations” (Bell, 2006, p.378). 
Additionally, “the structure and language of peace agreements suggest that the parties 
mutually view them as legal documents” (ibid). What renders the determination of the 
legal status of a peace agreement problematic, however, is the blurred line between a 
conflict being neither entirely interstate nor internal in nature, “the presence of non-state 
signatories tends to take them outside international legal definitions of ‘treaty’ or 
‘international agreement,’ while the presence of multiple state parties tends to make 
them difficult to analyze as domestic legal documents” (ibid). Scholarly opinion is 
divided on this issue: “While most authors do not view peace agreements as treaties, 
some suggest that they form part of new transnational regimes [...] Critics of these 
proposals point out that the creation of new regimes leads to new self-contained 
categories that go against the purpose of these agreements: often, parties to a peace 
accord [...] do not want to be separated from international law, but rather connected to 
it” in order to “provide protection from possible modifications and future breaches” and 
therefore advocate for an interpretation according to which “peace accords must be 
under-stood as binding agreements under international law because this legal status is 
key to achieving the benefits sought by these agreements” (Betancur Restrepo, 2016, 
p.190).           
 In addition to the method of assessing the final peace agreement and the 
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following DDR and TJ measures against the backdrop of the set of indicators derived 
from the eights UNSCRs comprising the WPS framework, this thesis makes use of 
some complementary field research in the form of interviews and personal field 
observations. To this end, I spent four weeks during March 2017 in Colombia’s capital 
Bogotá. As an intern of the women’s rights organisation Casa de la Mujer, I sought to 
broaden my understanding of the complex conflict dynamics at hand and to enrich my 
thesis work with some sources of additional information.     
 Apart from my experiences with the Casa de la Mujer, I conducted interviews 
with representatives of the following organisations: Ruta Pacífica, UN Women 
Colombia, Women’s Link Worldwide, and the International Office for Human Rights – 
Action on Colombia (OIDHACO Spanish acronym) in order to deepen my 
understanding of how useful of an instrument the UN’s WPS framework is on the 
ground and in the context of the armed conflict in Colombia in particular.
9
 The 
interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, loosely following the questions 
attached in the annex of this thesis. The aim of these investigations was to shed light on 
the question not only as to what extent the WPS framework is reflected in the peace 
process, but how much of an active use these organisations make of Resolution 1325. 
Also importantly, what their attitude towards this framework looked like in order to see 
whether an explicit link exists between the level of inclusivity of the Colombian peace 
process and the existence of the WPS framework at an international level.  
 Furthermore, with regard to conducting interviews and field research, the 
specificities of the feminist approach need to be taken into account. As Cecilie and Iver 
Neumann (2015), point out “feminist literature [...] has first and foremost pinpointed the 
pre-field phase and addressed the relevance of autobiographical situatedness” (p.4). 
Consequently, before engaging in field research and sharing my observations with my 
audience, it is advisable to point to my own situatedness which is characterised by a 
high level of privilege due to my origin and upbringing. It becomes striking when 
compared to the lives of women coming from countries suffering from conflict and an 
overall less fortunate and stable economic and political situation – this should be kept in 
mind at all times. Consequently, my perspective is shaped by several layers of privilege 
such as analysing conflicts mainly from afar and it is not comparable to the problems 
                                                     
9
 For more information on these organisations see Appendix 5 
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and issues the majority of women face in their daily lives all over the world. While 
travelling to Bogotá was supposed to mitigate some of these issues by experiencing the 
conflict from within the country itself, instead of merely reading about it from a great 
distance, I did not visit the actual zones of fighting or disarmament thereby still 
enjoying a greater level of safety than the majority of subjects I am researching.   
 Starting from this position of privilege logically has consequences for each 
following step of my research. Therefore, an attempt was made to structure the research 
along the principle of supplication which is about “seeking reciprocal relationships 
based on empathy and mutual respect” while acknowledging “that the knowledge of the 
person being researched (at least regarding the particular questions being asked) is 
greater than that of the researcher” (England, 1994, p.243). What makes this approach 
appealing is the possibility to point out and deal with “asymmetrical and potentially 
exploitative power relations by shifting a lot of power over to the researched” (England, 
1994, p.243, original emphasis). Furthermore, with regard to my research, a distinction 
needs to be made between getting in contact with women working for international or 
domestic civil society organisations, and with the ‘ordinary’ women living in post-
conflict Colombia. While activists aim at representing less marginalised voices, they 
themselves can be considered more privileged with regard to the resources at their 
disposal.  
Contribution to the Literature and Significance of the Research 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the existing literature on women and conflict by 
turning the rather abstract WPS framework consisting of various UNSCRs into a set of 
measurable indicators. This serves the purpose of facilitating the application of the WPS 
framework to a concrete case study thereby assessing its presence in current peace 
building efforts involving the UN. The Colombian case as such is of interest and 
deserves attention as it not only represents one of the longest on-going internal armed 
conflicts worldwide, but also serves as an example of how a negotiated solution to a 
prolonged conflict has been found without external intervention. Due to the dynamic 
nature of post-conflict contexts, the timing of this research is decisive as it incorporates 
the latest developments in the Colombian peace process with the signing of the final 
peace accord only having taken place several months ago and with implementation 
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being in its crucial first phase. Moreover, it follows the UN’s global study on the 
implementation of 1325 marking the 15th anniversary of the passing of the Resolution. 
It therefore incorporates all eight Resolutions of the WPS framework thereby enabling a 
state of the art analysis.         
 With the bulk of the literature focusing on the first two Resolutions of the WPS 
framework, namely UNSCR 1325 and 1820, this thesis seeks to add to the existing 
literature by expanding the scope of the analysis to also include the latest developments 
with regard to the UN’s WPS agenda. It does so by scrutinising to what extent the 
provisions outlined in the (latest) Resolutions are featured in the Colombian peace 
agreement between the Santos government and the FARC. This research, additionally, 
seeks to deepen our understanding of how women can contribute to peace processes as 
well as which roles women play in the Colombian peace process in particular. The 
subsequent analysis, furthermore, seeks to add to our understanding of TJ measures 
with regard to victims of sexual violence and scrutinises in greater detail a finding 
articulated by Aroussi (2011), according to which “provisions on justice for victims of 
sexual violence remain very scarce in peace agreements and the UN agenda on women, 
peace and security has not so far impacted on peace agreements” while criticising the 
“glaring omission . . . of any forms of reparations or other forms of redress for victims” 
(p.585) and test this statement in the Colombian context.  
 
Limitations  
While the timing of this research can certainly be regarded as an asset, it also 
complicates the assessment of compliance of the Colombian final peace agreement with 
the WPS framework as it is too early on in the process to measure its impact on the 
DDR and TJ processes conclusively. Moreover, there is always the danger of ‘backlash’ 
and whether the measures envisioned in the accord can prove successful in addressing 
the underlying causes of violence and discrimination against women remains to be seen. 
Consequently, the analysis as undertaken in this thesis with regard to the agreement’s 
implementation phase is limited to pointing out first tendencies, and a full assessment of 
the accord’s implementation in accordance with the WPS framework is to be left to 
future research projects. A further limitation relates to the fact that findings are difficult 
to generalize, and future research would benefit from including more cases to further 
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test the findings of this study to single out possible pathways of improvement when 
implementing the WPS framework.       
 Limitations to this thesis, moreover, persist due to the fact that analyzing the 
WPS agenda’s influence on the final peace accord only tells us little as to what extent 
the actual everyday lives of women in Colombia are going to improve. Peace 
agreements always embody compromise between the disputing parties and the language 
used in these documents therefore is vague, and the measures envisioned tend to lack 
clear definitions. Similarly, establishing a clear link between the provisions envisioned 
in the UNSCRs and the measures outlined in the Colombian final peace agreement 
could prove problematic. Even in cases in which compliance of the final peace accord 
with the UN framework can be observed, it might be difficult to mark this compliance 
as being a direct consequence of the WPS frame. Furthermore, with regard to the set of 
indicators derived from the eight UNSCRs, one needs to take into account that not all of 
these indicators are applicable to the Colombian context. It also may be difficult to 
decide at what point exactly an indicator can be considered fulfilled.  
Nevertheless, this thesis has sought to remedy some of these limitations by 
focusing not only on the UN level of analysis, but by incorporating field research and 
interviews moving the analysis closer to the grassroot level and the everyday 
experiences of Colombian women. Additionally, in order to overcome the issue of 
doubts with regard to the fulfilment of some of the indicators, the analysis is not limited 
to the final accord only and incorporates some key developments in the judicial and 
political spheres which took place in the years preceding the Havana peace talks as well 
as by including some of the implementation process’ early DDR and TJ efforts.   
 The following section now seeks to give a brief overview of the factors that gave 
rise to conflict in Colombia and of the different actors involved. In this context, a 
special emphasis is being put on the various roles women played during the internal 
armed struggle as well as the country’s history of peace talks.  
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4. Overview: Women and the Colombian Internal Armed Conflict 
The internal struggle between the FARC guerrilla and the Colombian state officially 
began in 1964 (Hörtner, 2013). Struggles over genuine political participation of 
marginalised groups as a result of persisting social and economic imbalance between the 
different societal segments and geographical regions within Colombia, as well as the 
strong polarisation of society along the lines of Liberal and Conservative party 
alignment, are recurring themes within the conflict (Gehring & Gontermann, 2012). 
One example of this are the years preceding active conflict between the FARC and the 
government, known as La Violencia, constituting one of the darkest chapters in 
Colombian history. Provoked by the assassination of promising Liberal presidential 
candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the years from 1948 to 1957 saw civil war-like 
conditions, such as the infamous Bogotazo riots, turning the country’s capital into a 
battlefield, leaving around 200 000 Colombians dead. Gaitán had gathered significant 
support among the population due to his plans to address two of the key dividends in 
Colombian society: ongoing political exclusion by the country’s elites of large 
fragments of society, and the persistent refusal to initiate direly needed agricultural 
reforms (Hataway, 2016, McFee, 2016, Gehring & Gontermann, 2012, König & 
Schuster, 2008). Consequently, many voters were left disappointed and in the end “the 
violence strengthened the traditional parties as the collective identities derived from 
membership were all that gave the violence meaning” (González, 2004, p.12). The rural 
self-defence groups which had formed in response to Conservative counter-attacks after 
the Bogotazo uprisings were to lay the foundation for the formation of the FARC. The 
political parties established what was called the Frente Nacional – the National Front 
instead; an agreement between the two major parties to share power evenly (König & 
Schuster, 2008). Subsequently, every four years control would be handed over from one 
party to the other. The National Front ended in 1974 which, however, did not translate 
into increased political participation by the guerrilla movements (König & Schuster, 
2008, McFee, 2016).          
 The Colombian state as an actor in the country’s internal armed struggle is 
mainly characterised by its weakness. The lack of a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force resulted in a lack of control over large parts of the country’s territory, enabling 
different armed actors to establish their own spheres of influence. State control is still 
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mainly limited to urban spaces and areas with resources and the Colombian state, 
throughout most of its history, suffered from a severe lack of legitimacy and societal 
consensus. This allowed violence to become a key element in the construction and 
maintenance of the state. Violence in Colombia therefore, “constitutes a central 
foundation of nation building without, however, being monopolised by a single actor 
and with even less overarching legitimacy” (Kurtenbach, 2010, p.4). Since the 1980s, 
various rightwing paramilitary groups have played a role in the internal armed conflict 
in Colombia clashing with the leftwing FARC over territory and resources. Originally 
created by land owners as legal self-defence groups to protect their property from the 
growing influence of the guerrillas, they began to unite and organise themselves 
independently under the overall umbrella organisation Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC) in the mid 1990s. Tolerated by the state, these armed rightwing 
groups engaged in extraordinarily aggressive and gruesome strategies to curb their 
enemy’s resistance and became the unofficial key component of the state’s counter-
insurgency efforts (König & Schuster, 2008). Nevertheless, “the main targets of these 
groups have been unarmed civilians accused of being 'guerrilla collaborators', 
'parasubversives', or 'plainclothes guerrillas'. Paramilitary groups have killed, silenced, 
or forced the displacement of thousands of trade unionists, social, political or human 
rights activists and leaders” (Romero, 2004, p.58).      
 The paramilitaries started to officially demobilise in 2004 under then President 
Álvaro Uribe. However, some fear that this process of demobilisation only masks a 
process of legalisation of these groups, given the strong existing links between 
paramilitary forces, the state military, and the Colombian government (Gehring & 
Gontermann, 2012, König & Schuster, 2008). On top of that, not all paramilitary groups 
followed the command to demobilise. As a consequence, dissident groups, now known 
as bandas criminales (BACRIM), continue to exercise influence rampantly in more 
remote regions of the country. Their heavy involvement in the drug trade significantly 
contributes to the continuous displacement of the civilian population as well as to the 
targeted killings of social movement leaders and human rights advocates. When talking 
to a young man during my stay in Bogotá who was originally from the Caquetá region 
in the south of Colombia, he agreed with the widespread notion that the Colombian state 
is neither trustworthy nor present in many regions of the country, leaving the population 
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to its own devices in the midst of the ongoing conflict: “We were not happy about the 
peace accord [...] at least they [the FARC] protected us”.     
 In contrast to the leftist guerrilla groups, female presence in the paramilitaries is 
relatively low and “not much is known about women paramilitaries” as certain 
characteristics of this group of combatants “such as the extremely tough military 
training, the culture of violence, and, especially, machismo, makes it unlikely that the 
number of women and girls who would voluntarily join is high” (Kunz & Sjöberg, 
2009, p.8). Moreover, female members of paramilitary groups are less likely to take part 
in military undertakings outside the base, and their share of female fighters is estimated 
to be around 12 per cent (Ocampo et al, 2014; Cockburn, 2007). Consequently, out of 
around 30 000 demobilised paramilitary fighters, only 1960 were female (Kunz & 
Sjöberg, 2009). 
Colombia, moreover, is home to numerous left-wing guerrilla groups with the 
two biggest ones being the FARC, and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, the 
National Liberation Army (ELN). The number of female members of both FARC and 
ELN is said to vary between 30 and 40 per cent (O’Neill, 2015). Feminist scholarly 
opinion on women joining armed insurgent groups as female fighters is divided. 
Whereas some might argue that it represents a symbol of empowerment challenging 
traditional gender roles and domains perceived to be inherently masculine, others regard 
it as the expression of a deeply militarized society in which women are left with no 
choice but to acquire masculine traits and occupations in order to survive (Kunz & 
Sjöberg, 2009).  
Presenting itself as an organisation with a mission to fight for social justice, the 
FARC regards itself as a group advancing feminist goals. Called Farianas, female 
recruits of the FARC promote the guerrilla group as a motor for social change, and an 
instrument to advance gender equality. Their mission states that “Equal responsibility 
commits us men and women to carry out the revolutionary project; our statute confers to 
us equal rights and obligations”10 (Farianas, 2013). The reasons for women (and men) to 
join an armed guerrilla group are diverse. Whereas some might agree with the mission 
of the guerrilla and see it as a legitimate and promising way to improve the political and 
social conditions in Colombia, others do not have much of a choice. Living in extreme 
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 “A hombres y mujeres nos compromete igual responsabilidad de sacar adelante el proyecto 
revolucionario, nuestro estatuto nos confiere los mismos derechos y deberes” 
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poverty or in areas traditionally controlled by a guerrilla group might constitute reasons 
to join. One former female FARC recruit recalls that “In the countryside, there are 
regions where the only law is the one of the FARC or the paramilitaries”11 (Sulé, 
2014b).  
Nonetheless, there are numerous accounts to be found according to which the 
FARC’s female combatants are not as liberated as stated in official FARC sources. One 
often cited example of the FARC monitoring women’s bodies is the one of obligatory 
use of birth control as well as forced abortions. Having children in the midst of war is 
considered impractical and even in cases where pregnancies had been allowed by 
commanders, these children had to be given away into someone else’s care. Estimates 
state there might have been around 1000 forced abortions per year among the FARC; 
exact numbers are, however, difficult obtain as it is not a practice well documented 
(Rendón Marulanda, 2017). Moreover, as one former female FARC member observes, 
“with time you acquire masculine roles and behaviours, even the way of speaking and 
walking was lost”12 coming to the conclusion that only upon leaving the FARC “I 
returned to being a woman”13 (Sulé, 2014c). 
Other influential actors involved in the conflict are the international community, 
domestic civil society organisations, and the Catholic Church. The reputation of the 
Catholic Church during the mediation efforts has been the one of a “moral and spiritual 
guide” (Bell, 2006, p.401). With regard to the armed conflict, the Catholic Church in 
Colombia was most active in matters of reconciliation and providing a platform for the 
civilian victims of the conflict to exercise direct influence on the negotiations in Havana 
(Acevedo, 2016). Prior to the negotiations, Colombia suffered from the reputation of 
being a regional troublemaker and agreeing to involve the international community in 
the peace process is considered one of the core factors for its eventual success of 
leading to an agreement (García-Peña, 2004). Leaving aside the Havana peace talks, the 
involvement of the international community in the Colombian conflict has been mainly 
characterized by the US and its ‘Plan Colombia’, now mainly seen as a counter-
insurgency programme directed against left-wing guerrilla groups (Ramírez Ocampo, 
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 “En el campo, hay regiones donde la única ley es la de las FARC o la de los paramilitares” 
12
 “Con el paso del tiempo adquieres roles y comportamientos masculinos, se perdía hasta la forma de 
hablar y de caminar” 
13
 “volví a ser mujer” 
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2004). Despite the $10 billion invested by the US in counter-narcotics strategies since 
the year 2000, cocaine production has risen by 32 per cent (Maas, 2017). Not 
surprisingly, US backing of Colombia’s state armed forces, especially under the harsh 
policies of then-President Uribe, eventually also benefitted rightwing paramilitary 
groups (Selfa, 2005).           
 While often experiencing failures in efforts to achieve peace, Colombian society 
has proven determined to achieve an end to hostilities and one of the causes attributed to 
the failure of a great number of these initiatives is seen in the Colombian elites’ lack of 
interest in bringing about profound reforms, “While the Colombian Establishment 
maybe has the 'will for peace' it does not have the ‘will for change’. It wants peace but 
without eliminating the causes of the conflict” (Lozano Guillén, 2004, p.61). 
Disenchantment usually follows the failure of an official round of peace talks and might 
lead the negotiators, fighters, and big parts of the civilian population to believe that it is 
not a strategy worth pursuing. Subsequently, after the failed 2002 peace talks, prospects 
for peace in Colombia looked grim and then-President Uribe’s response was not meant 
to settle the conflict by political means but by military defeat only. In the time period of 
2002-2012, the role women played on an individual as well as collective level 
was crucial in keeping alive the spirit that peace by a negotiated settlement was indeed 
achievable. Their contributions were manifold and involved activities such as 
negotiating with insurgents or other armed actors in order to release hostages, to 
establish local ceasefires, and to lift roadblocks to keep up the flow of food and 
medicine. Moreover, they reported on committed human rights violations and were of 
core importance to direct top-level attention to matters such as returning refugees and 
internally displaced people, as well as compensation for victims (Strasser, 2016; UN 
Global Study, 2015).          
 Nonetheless, faultlines continue to run deep within Colombia’s population and 
the close rejection of the first version of the peace accord between the FARC and the 
government in a plebiscite in October 2016, risked a new period of disenchantment 
taking hold of Colombian society. As María Isabel Rueda (2017) observes: “The 
negotiations with the FARC included concessions which many consider exorbitant – 
like the one that assassins and kidnappers can do politics [...] today, the drug dealers do 
not have to prove their innocence anymore to save themselves from prison or 
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extradition, instead it is sufficient to say that they belonged to the FARC in order to stay 
free”14. 
While different reasons for the ‘no’ vote can be found, interesting with regard to 
this work’s research focus, concerns over the accord’s ‘gender ideology’ also formed 
part of the reasons for certain segments of voters to reject the proposal with “references 
to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) issues in the peace 
agreement” (ICG, 2017, p.11) which were “ripped out of context and used to anger most 
Evangelical voters” (ibid) due to their allegedly negative effects on the traditional 
spheres of family and society. This supposedly existing “gender ideology came back 
like a zombie” in the debates leading up to the plebiscite and the opposition portrayed 
the provisions of the accord as “making your kids homosexual”15 which led many 
people to reject the original version. Without a doubt, the gender focus of the accord can 
be described as “a deed with few precedents in the history of peace negotiations and 
political transitions, and draws from the accumulated knowledge, experience, and 
activism resulting from various processes of peace construction from the rest of the 
world”16 (Serrano-Amaya, 2016, p.4). Moreover, what renders the inclusion of a gender 
focus into both the peace talks and the final accord important is that it acknowledges 
“the patriarchy, machismo, and gender hierarchies as causes for violence and 
exclusion”17 (ibid).   
One example for the wariness still prevailing among a significant number of 
Colombians with regard to matters of ‘gender’, as well as the opposition’s willingness 
to exploit these fears was the ‘march against corruption’ on April 1st 2017 in Bogotá. It 
was organised by the opposition and was met with suspicion by many people. 
Supposedly serving as an outlet for the dissatisfaction of the population with the latest 
corruption scandal, involving current president Santos’ election campaign (Rüb, 2017), 
resistance was mainly channelled towards the current peace process. Some slogans 
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 “Las negociaciones con las Farc incluyeron concesiones que muchos consideran exorbitantes –como la 
de que los asesinos y secuestradores puedan hacer política [...] hoy, los narcotraficantes ya no tienen que 
demostrar su inocencia para salvarse de la cárcel y de la extradición, sino que les basta decir que fueron 
de las Farc para quedar en libertad” 
15
 From an interview with a lawyer working at Women’s Link Worldwide, 30.3.17 
16
 “Es un hecho con pocos precedentes en la historia de las negociaciones de paz y las transiciones 
políticas, y recoge el acumulado de conocimiento, experiencia y activismo resulatado de diversos 
procesos de construcción de paz a lo largo del mundo” 
17
 “el patriarcado, el machismo y las jerarquías del género las causas de las violencias y la exclusión” 
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during the march read as “FARC are the true beneficiaries of the state” and “they stole 
the plebiscite from us”. 18 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Protestors during the march in Bogotá organised by the opposition on April 
1
st
, 2017, source: author. 
 
After briefly summarising some of the underlying factors fuelling the conflict by 
introducing the various actors involved in the fighting, as well as their attitudes towards 
women, the subsequent section aims to analyse in greater detail how gender sensitive 
the Final Peace Accord turned out, constituting the core analytical part of this thesis. 
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 Field trip observation, 1.4.17 
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5. Analysis of the 2012-2016 Peace Process in Colombia from a Feminist 
Perspective 
The Final Peace Accord between the Santos government and the FARC is structured 
into the following key sections: land reform, political participation, termination of the 
conflict, solving the problem of illicit crops, guarantees of no repetition and reparations 
to the victims, and steps of implementation. A gender sub-commission was tasked to 
review all of these sections to ensure they did not fall short of a gender dimension. 
Overall, the negotiating team followed the formula of “nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed”19 meaning that the accord could only be accepted as a whole 
(Gobierno Nacional & FARC, 2016, p.5). The Final Peace Accord at 310 pages is the 
longest peace agreement produced in an intrastate conflict and is considerably longer 
than any previous peace agreement signed in the Colombian context (Bell, 2016). 
 The following sections seek to assess how inclusive the final version of the 
peace accord is as it constitutes the core document for designing a post-conflict 
Colombian society. The analysis proceeds by scrutinising to what extent the following 
four central themes, or pillars, as established by the WPS framework and summarised 
by George and Shepherd (2016), are found in the final peace accord. These pillars are: 
prevention (strategies to combat violence), participation (addressing women’s political 
leadership in peace and security governance), protection (of both the rights and bodies 
of women), relief and recovery (for conflict survivors, particularly survivors of 
sexualised violence in conflict). In order to measure the peace process’ compliance with 
the UN’s WPS agenda, each pillar has been broken down into a list of indicators which 
are now tested against the backdrop of the formulations found in the final peace 
agreement and some of the follow up DDR and TJ measures. The latter, however, are to 
be treated as preliminary findings since the implementation phase has only been 
initiated towards the end of 2016. Consequently, each of the subsequent sections begins 
by introducing the list of indicators making up the respective pillar under discussion, 
and is then followed by applying these indicators to the case of the latest Colombian 
peace process.  
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 “nada está acordado hasta que todo esté acordado” 
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5.1 Pillar I – Participation  
Table 1. Participation (women’s political leadership in peace and security governance) 
Indicator Resolution Description Compliance 
1.1 1325 Participation of women at all decision making 
levels for the prevention, management, and 
resolution of conflict 
 
1.2 1325 Involvement of women in implementation 
mechanisms of peace agreements 
 
1.3 2422 Meaningful inclusion of women in peace talk 
delegations 
 
    1.4 1889 Gender mainstreaming approach in all post-
conflict, peacebuilding, and recovery processes 
 
1.5 1889 Equal access of women and girls to education in 
post-conflict scenarios 
 
 
1.6 2122 Women’s full and equal participation in all 
phases of electoral processes 
 
 
1.7 1889 Measures to improve women’s participation 
especially at early stages of the process 
 
1.8 2122 Funding mechanisms to help local civil society 
and organisations who support women’s 
leadership development and participation at all 
decision-making levels  
 
1.9 2122 Women’s participation in efforts to combat and 
eradicate the illicit transfer and misuse of small 
arms and light weapons 
 
1.10 2422 Support for participation of women and 
women’s organisations in humanitarian action 
 
1.11 1889 Measures to counter negative societal attitudes 
about women’s capacity to participate equally  
 
 
Compliance 
The aim to promote the participation of women at all decision making levels for the 
prevention, management, and resolution of conflict as envisioned in indicator 1.1 is 
applicable to the Colombian context. The introductory pages of the peace agreement 
between the Santos government and the FARC thereby state the following: 
“Emphasising that the new Final Accord pays special attention to the fundamental rights 
of women”20 (p.3, original emphasis). With regard to overall political participation, 
furthermore, it strives for “the promotion of the participation and leadership of women 
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 “Subrayando que el nuevo Acuerdo Final presta especial atención a los derechos fundamentales de las 
mujeres” 
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in politics”21 (p.54). Moreover, it notes that both “the national government and the 
FARC reject any form of discrimination against women and reaffirm that the 
contribution of women as political subjects in public life is vital for the strengthening of 
democracy and for the maintenance and promotion of peace”22 (p.55). In addition to 
that, the agreement states that both “the national government and the FARC recognise 
the important role which women play in the prevention and solution of conflicts and in 
the consolidation of peace”23 (p.55, emphasis added). Hence, the two parties recognise 
“the necessity to promote and invigorate the political and civic participation of women, 
even more so in the context of the end of the armed conflict, where their leadership and 
participation on equal footing are necessary and essential [...] to achieve a stable and 
durable peace”24 (ibid). 
Involving women in the implementation mechanisms of peace agreements, as set 
out by indicator 1.2, therefore is an integral part of the latest Colombian peace process 
and “the participation of women and their organisations and their equal representation in 
the various spaces of participation”25 (ibid) are to be guaranteed by the agreement. 
Concerning women’s organisations’ contributions to the peace process, the two parties 
to the agreement reiterate their “profound gratefulness”26 and stress that “with their 
[women’s rights organisations’ among others] participation we will achieve the 
construction of a stable and durable peace”27 (p.9). In order for this to happen, the 
adoption of “specific measures to guarantee that women and men participate and benefit 
on an equal footing from the implementation of this accord” is considered essential 
(p.10) as “a society in which women participate actively is a more democratic society 
and the strengthening of their organisations is important”28 (p.42). With regard to the 
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 “promoción de la participación y liderazgo de la mujer en la política” 
22
 “El Gobierno Nacional y las FARC-EP rechazan cualquier forma de discriminación contra la mujer y 
reafirman que el aporte de las mujeres como sujetos políticos en la vida pública es vital para el 
fortalecimiento de la democracia y para el mantenimiento y el fomento de la paz” 
23
 “El Gobierno Nacional y las FARC-EP reconocen el importante papel que desempeñan las mujeres en 
la prevención y solución de los conflictos y en la consolidación de la paz” 
24
 “la necesidad de promover y fortalecer la participación política y ciudadana de las mujeres, aún más en 
el marco del fin del conflicto, donde su liderazgo y participación en pie de igualdad son necesarios y 
esenciales [...] para alcanzar una paz estable y duradera” 
25
 “la participación de las mujeres y sus organizaciones y su representación equitativa en los diferentes 
espacios de participación” 
26
 “profundo agradecimiento” 
27
 “Con su participación lograremos la construcción de una paz estable y duradera” 
28
 “una sociedad en la que las mujeres participan activamente es una sociedad más democrática, es 
importante el fortalecimiento de sus organizaciones” 
47 
 
inclusion of women in the implementation phase, the signatories to the agreement 
commit to respecting the gender focus at all stages of the process and with respect to all 
five parts of the accord (p.210). The Committee keeping track of the verification of the 
implementation of the final accord, moreover, will be assisted in their work by a special 
instance comprised of six women’s rights organisations from Colombia in order to 
monitor compliance with the accord’s gender focus during the implementation phase 
(p.196).         
Indicator 1.3 covering the issue of women’s meaningful inclusion in peace talk 
delegations can be considered fulfilled in the Colombian case, albeit with some delay. 
On the side of the government two women were nominated as plenipotentiaries (Nigeria 
Rentería and María Paulina Reveros) in November 2013. On behalf of the FARC 
women also saw a growing representation when compared to the beginning of the talks 
and by February 2015 made up 40 per cent of the delegation thereby reflecting the 
actual composition of the guerrilla group (Bouvier, 2016). Casa de la Mujer in their 
intervention to the Havana Peace Talk Round Table of December 15, 2014, notes that: 
“This is a historical landmark for the country and for Colombian women. For the first 
time in a history of talks for ending the armed conflict, we are talking as equals: the 
Colombian government delegates, FARC-EP, and women organisations [...] We, 
women, shall not be agreed on in these agreements, we want to be a party to the 
agreements because our voice counts” (Casmujer, 2014, p.2). As a consequence, a 
gender sub-commission was established with the task to revise what had already been 
agreed according to the criteria of a gender focus, while at the same time ensuring that 
any future provisions would be formulated in a gender sensitive manner.   
 This is in accordance with indicator 1.4 which aims at achieving a gender 
mainstreaming approach in all post-conflict, peacebuilding, and recovery processes. The 
accord defines its gender focus as “The acknowledgment of the equality of rights of 
men and women, and the special circumstances of each one, especially women 
notwithstanding their marital status, life cycle, and family or communal relations, as 
holders of rights and special constitutional protection [...] to promote this equality, the 
active participation of women and their organisations in the construction of peace [...] 
it is required to advance affirmative measures, which respond to the disproportionate 
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impacts the armed conflict had on women, in particular sexual violence”29 (p.193, 
emphasis added). Consequently, the entire text of the accord has been revised to ensure 
that it corresponds to this definition and, furthermore, calls for adapting “differentiated 
actions so that women can access under equal conditions the programmes and plans 
contained in this accord”30 (ibid).  
Resulting from the work of the gender commission are provisions in the final 
peace agreement which comply with indicators 1.5 and 1.6. With regard to indicator 1.5, 
guaranteeing the equal access of women and girls to education in post-conflict 
scenarios, provisions can be found in the accord. Education is therefore seen as a way to 
facilitate and encourage women’s participation in constructing a Colombian society 
post-conflict and encompasses both the areas of professional training as well as the 
education of women on their rights. A special emphasis is hereby put on the particular 
conditions faced by rural women. The accord seeks to mitigate the challenges to 
claiming their benefits by educating women living in rural areas about their rights and 
their access to justice (p.18). This is supposed to be achieved by for instance promoting 
professional training to women in disciplines considered non-traditional to them as well 
as by creating more universities in rural areas accession to which is to be awarded on a 
non-discriminatory basis (pp.27, 32).      
 Additionally, in order to ensure women’s full and equal participation in electoral 
processes as prescribed in indicator 1.6, the final Colombian peace accord aims at 
establishing an expert commission with the task of elaborating advice on electoral 
reform. The accord, moreover, acknowledges the difficulties women encounter in 
conflict affected areas with regard to exercising their voting rights (p.36). In reaction to 
that, the accord seeks to ensure women’s access to measures such as “information 
campaigns, training, pedagogy and dissemination”31 which have as their aim the 
promotion of “electoral participation at the national and regional level, with special 
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 “el reconocimiento de la igualdad de derechos entre hombres y mujeres y de las circunstancias 
especiales de cada uno, especialmente de las mujeres independientemente de su estado civil, ciclo vital y 
relación familiar y comunitaria, como sujeto de derechos y de especial protección constitucional [...] para 
promover esa igualdad, la participación activa de las mujeres y sus organizaciones en la construcción de 
la paz [...] se requiere adelantar medidas afirmativas que respondan a los impactos desproporcionados que 
ha tenido el conflicto armado en las mujeres, en particular la violencia sexual” 
30
 “acciones diferenciadas para que las mujeres puedan acceder en igualdad de condiciones a los planes y 
programas contenidos en este Acuerdo” 
31
 “campañas de información, capacitación, pedagogía y divulgación”  
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emphasis on promot[ing] greater participation of women”32 (p.51). With regard to the 
upcoming presidential elections, and the counterproductive consequences their results 
could have on the implementation of the peace accord, women’s rights organisation 
Ruta Pacífica now regards it necessary to leave the social sector to become more 
political in their actions. This serves the purpose of countering election campaigns 
based on disinformation, which are exploiting the fact that the majority of Colombians 
has not read the actual accord.
33
 Women’s effective participation, finally, is considered 
important in the fight against corruption on all political levels and during election 
campaigns (p.48). 
Non-Compliance 
While there is evidence for the increased participation of women and their organisations 
in the official part of the peace negotiations, not all indicators with regard to the 
participation of women in matters of peace and security are met in the Colombian 
context. Indicator 1.7, for instance, which deals with the early involvement of women in 
the peace process, can be considered not present in the Colombian case. This is due to 
the fact that the participation of women, despite continuous contributions of women’s 
rights organisations in the years leading up to the Havana peace talks, was close to non-
existent on both sides at the beginning of the talks. Almost all seats were taken by men, 
with the only exception of the Norwegian moderator. Each team consisted of up to 30 
members and was allowed up to ten negotiators including five plenipotentiaries 
enjoying full negotiating power. In Cuba, however, all plenipotentiaries and with the 
exception of Tanja Nijmeijer, the Dutch guerrilla, all negotiators were male (Bouvier, 
2016). Similarly, with regard to the previous peace processes taking place in Colombia 
over the past twenty years, women were completely absent (ABColombia, 2013). 
Change came one year into the negotiations, following a National Summit of Women 
for Peace in October 2013 in Bogotá initiated by a variety of women’s rights 
organisations, including the Ruta Pacífica and Casa de la Mujer, and backed by the UN 
in Colombia and UN Women Colombia.   
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 “la participación electoral a nivel nacional y regional, con especial énfasis en promover una mayor 
participación de las mujeres” 
33
 From an interview with a representative of Ruta Pacífica Pacífica, 24.3.17 
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Making sure women benefit equally from financial support and subsidies, as 
envisioned by indicator 1.8, is also a matter of concern in the Colombian peace 
agreement. In this context, rural women are singled out in need for support to realise 
their claims to land and subsidies and special measures to account for these needs are to 
be designed accordingly (p.15) to “promote the economic empowerment of rural 
women”34 (p.31) and strengthen rural women’s rights organisations’ access to financial 
and technical support for their projects (p.104). Consequently, in the accord the 
government agrees to design and implement a plan to improve the living conditions of 
the country’s rural population thereby including measures to help rural women 
overcome barriers to financing (p.30). Generally speaking, however, while some 
references to the need for funding civil society organisations are found in the agreement, 
there are no concrete measures designed to directly help local civil society and 
organisations which support women’s leadership development and participation at all 
decision-making levels. When in need of funding, these organisations continue to 
address their concerns mainly in front of the UN Women in Colombia, which has been 
responsible for a large share of the funding.
35
 
While the gender sensitivity of Colombia’s DDR process is discussed in the next 
section, with regard to indicator 1.9 which seeks to measure women’s participation in 
efforts to combat and eradicate the illicit transfer and misuse of small arms and light 
weapons, no references are to be found in the peace accord. Similarly, indicator 1.10 
dealing with the support for women’s participation in humanitarian action is not 
addressed in the final peace agreement either. Important in the Colombian context but 
not listed as one of the indicators of the WPS agenda, however, is the fact that the 
accord draws a connection between the consummation and production of illicit drugs 
and the issue of violence against women (p.98). As a consequence, it calls for strategies 
to be designed to protect women, girls, young people, and adolescents from this kind of 
violence and to actively involve women in the process by training and involving them in 
the design and follow-up actions to combat this type of violence (p.117). Illicit crop 
cultivation and the drug trade are criticised as a source of violence fostering an overall 
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 “promover el empoderamiento económico de las mujeres rurales” 
35
 From an interview with a representative of UN Women Colombia, 28.3.17 
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climate of hostility and intolerance and the accord explicitly blames “stereotypes related 
to drug trafficking which incite gender-based violence”36 (p.120).  
In relation to that, indicator 1.11 deals with the important issue of designing 
measures to counter negative societal attitudes about women’s capacity to participate 
equally. While several references to the need to create an open and tolerant society in 
order to avoid the stigmatisation of women and other vulnerable segments of the 
population are to be found in the accord, the formulations remain vague and the 
proposed actions lack clarity. References on this need are to be found, for instance, in 
the context of establishing a national Council for Reconciliation and Coexistence aimed 
at assisting the government in the prevention of “stigmatisation of vulnerable or 
discriminated against groups such as women”37 (p.47) while at the same time 
empowering leaders of social organisations and movements to avoid their 
stigmatisation. Moreover, the new system aimed at ensuring the participation and 
freedom of expression of political opposition “has to contribute to create and guarantee 
a culture of coexistence, tolerance and solidarity [...] to prevent any form of 
stigmatisation and persecution of leaders on grounds of their political activities”38 
(p.38). Furthermore, “the new system will incorporate special measures for women 
including the positive valuation of their public participation”39 (ibid). Hence, this 
system seeks the “support, through legal and technical assistance, the creation and 
strengthening of organisations and social movements [...] with extraordinary measures 
for women's organisations [...] and groups historically discriminated against”40 (p.43). 
In 2010, female activists working in Colombia in fields of land, labour, or indigenous 
rights were considered at the highest risk worldwide to be threatened or murdered 
(ABColombia, 2013). Recent developments, moreover, show that this trend is far from 
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 “estereotipos relacionados con el narcotráfico que incitan la violencia de género” 
37
 “estigmatización a grupos en condiciones de vulnerabilidad o discriminados como las mujeres” 
38
 “debe contribuir a crear y garantizar una cultura de convivencia, tolerancia y solidaridad 
[...] para prevenir cualquier forma de estigmatización y persecución de dirigentes por motivo de sus 
actividades políticas”  
39
 “El nuevo Sistema incorporará medidas especiales para las mujeres incluyendo la valoración positiva 
de su participación en lo público” 
40
 “Apoyar, mediante asistencia legal y técnica, la creación y el fortalecimiento de las 
organizaciones y movimientos sociales [...] con medidas extraordinarias a las organizaciones de mujeres 
[...] y de grupos históricamente discriminados” 
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being reversed: being the leader or member of a political or social movement in 
Colombia remains dangerous.
41
                                                     
41
 From an interview with a representative from OIDHACO, 7.4.17 
 
5.2 Pillar II – Prevention 
Table 2. Prevention (strategies to combat violence). 
Indicator Resolution Description Compliance 
2.1 1325, 1889 Gender sensitivity of DDR process / measures  
2.2 1820 Efforts to debunk myths fuelling sexual 
violence  
 
2.3 1820 Measures to sensitise troops on the matter of 
sexual violence 
 
2.4 1820 Vetting of armed and security forces against 
the background of past actions of sexual 
violence 
 
2.5 1888 Measures undertaken by civilian superiors and 
military commanders to prevent sexual 
violence 
 
 
Compliance 
The accord refers to the need to create an atmosphere in Colombia characterized by 
inclusion and explicitly links a lack of openness and tolerance to violence in its different 
forms. Subsequently, it seeks to promote “a culture of respect for disagreement and the 
interest in the prevention of violence against the ones exercising politics”42 (p.38). 
Furthermore, prevention of further violence in all its forms constitutes a “superior 
goal”43 (p.186). While indicator 2.1 could also fall under the previous one dealing with 
matters of participation, it is included in the second pillar covering prevention. This is 
due to the fact that a successful DDR process is essential in preventing future violent 
escalation among the different segments of Colombia’s population. A DDR process and 
its three stages, according to UN Peacekeeping, can be summarised as follows:  
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 “una cultura de respeto por la diferencia y el interés por la prevención de la violencia contra quienes 
ejercen la política” 
43
 “objetivo superior” 
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Table 3. DDR Process Overview according to the UN. 
1.) “Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants and often from the 
civilian population.”  
2.) “Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed 
forces and groups, including a phase of ‘reinsertion’ which provides short-term assistance to ex-
combatants.”  
3.) “Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain 
sustainable employment and income. It is a political, social and economic process with an open 
time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.”  
The challenges inherent to DDR processes are manifold and often fail to adopt a gender 
perspective. Consequently, measures are more tailored towards male ex-combatants, 
leaving behind their female companions (UN Global Study, 2015). Some of the 
challenges former combatants might face are similar for both women and men, others 
are specific to women. One example of this is the families or societies to where these 
female ex-combatants are returning to, can stigmatize or punish them for breaking with 
traditional gender roles. This uncertainty can be exacerbated in situations in which 
women are uneducated, poor, pregnant, or have small children to take care of. In this 
context, it is interesting to note that as the FARC is starting to demobilize and hand over 
their weapons to the UN, an emphasis by Colombian and German online newspapers is 
put on the fact that there are an increasing number of pregnant women and newborns to 
be found in these transitional zones. The niños de la paz, the children of the peace, are 
considered a definite sign that the armed conflict has come to an end with peace under 
way as women are leaving behind their role as combatant and become mothers instead 
(Rendón Marulanda, 2017; Spiegel, 2017).      
 Moreover, “men and women will need to work together to negotiate new 
identities and to create new understandings about what it means to be a man or a woman 
in a society at peace” (Bouvier, 2016, p. 25). In a society as the Colombian one “where 
violence against women has been tacitly accepted as a norm, the best approaches to 
prevention and protection require building a new culture that respects and empowers 
women” which includes “engaging women in visible leadership roles in the design and 
implementation of DDR programs” (ibid). This is where the important topic of mental 
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health comes into play as it is necessary to address the challenge of trauma both with 
regard to former combatants and other victims of the conflict. Concerns exist that these 
traumas, if unsolved, can potentially generate new violence in times of peace as the 
victims, according to the International Red Cross, “also carry scars in their heads”44 
(Casmujer, 2017).         
 With regard to monitoring the ceasefire, the agreement accounts for women’s 
organisations as potential contributors (p.232) and, moreover, calls for employing 
monitoring personnel equipped for dealing with cases of violence against women and 
sexual violence in particular (p.233). Additionally, several references are found for the 
monitoring mission to take into account the particular medical needs of women (pp.258-
60) as well as their logistic needs which might differ from those of men (p.269). 
However, this is without further specifying what these different needs entail and which 
measures are to be designed to meet them adequately. Whereas it is too early into the 
overall DDR process to draw definite conclusions, women belong to the ones 
monitoring the current disarmament of guerrilla fighters in the frame of close 
cooperation between the UN, the Colombian government, and the FARC (Colombia 
2020, 2017).           
 With regard to the reintegration of former FARC fighters into civilian life, the 
accord states that “the process of reincorporation will have a differentiated focus in all 
its components with an emphasis on the rights of women”45 (p.69). Within the 
Colombian Agency for Reintegration, moreover, women accounted for 57 per cent of 
the staff and 60 per cent of the contractor positions in 2014. However, “they have yet to 
break the glass ceiling in the organisation” (Bouvier, 2016, p.25). Whereas drawing 
definite conclusions on compliance with the first indicator of the prevention Pillar Is not 
yet possible at this point, it can be noted that first steps towards a more gender-sensitive 
DDR process have been initiated by the accord.       
 
 
                                                     
44“ también llevan las cicatrices de la violencia en la cabeza” 
45
 “El proceso de reincorporación tendrá en todos sus componentes un enfoque diferencial, con énfasis en 
los derechos de las mujeres” 
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Non-Compliance 
Tackling the underlying causes of violence is understood to be the best prevention of its 
further escalation. Nonetheless, when it comes to translating these into tangible 
measures to hold responsible the armed security forces, the police, or the state’s military 
leaders, provisions of this sort are omitted from the final peace agreement. One example 
for this is indicator 2.2 which deals with efforts to debunk myths fuelling sexual 
violence. Some level of recognition of this problem has taken place in Colombia as seen 
in the context of the ‘Global Leaders’ Meeting on Gender Equality and Women’s 
Empowerment’, according to which Colombian leaders commit to “work for the 
construction of new masculinities [...] to search for the full inclusion of men and boys 
with regard to the responsibility to achieve gender equality”46 (Global Leaders, 2015, 
p.4). Successful examples of these policies on a level closer to the everyday lives of 
Colombians, nevertheless, remain scarce and often face resistance among the population 
(Sanchez A., 2017). While the peace agreement mentions strategies of raising awareness 
of the situation of vulnerability of women to promote “actions to sensitise and guide the 
community and the institutions to prevent the stigmatization of the beneficiaries, which 
take into account [...] the differentiated impact on women”47 (p.119), no explicit 
references to measures aimed at debunking myths fuelling sexual violence are to be 
found in the final peace agreement.        
 In a similar vein, the three subsequent indicators on vetting the armed security 
forces against the background of past actions of sexual violence (2.3), measures to 
sensitise troops on the matter of sexual violence (2.4), as well as measures undertaken 
by civilian superiors and military commanders, to prevent sexual violence (2.5), are not 
mentioned in the peace agreement. In Colombia, the issue of sexual violence in 
connection with the state’s armed forces cannot be discussed in isolation from the 
problem of paramilitarism. As noted in one of the previous sections, the Colombian 
state is deeply entrenched with the paramilitary forces, which have officially 
demobilized but continue to commit grave human rights violations in the form of 
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 “Trabajar por la construcción de nuevas masculinidades [...] para buscar la inclusión plena de los 
hombres y niños en la responsabilidad de lograr la igualdad entre los géneros” 
47
 “Acciones para sensibilizar y guiar a la comunidad y a las instituciones para prevenir la estigmatización 
de los consumidores y las consumidoras, que tengan en cuenta [...] el impacto diferenciado en las 
mujeres” 
57 
 
dissident groups. Consequently, addressing this issue is considered highly sensitive. The 
accord, nevertheless, does acknowledge the issue of paramilitarism and recognizes the 
criminal structures originating from this phenomenon as the one of the main spoilers of 
peace thereby endangering the successful implementation of the accord (p.8).  
 Subsequently, the government is entrusted with the task to develop measures to 
shed light on what gives rise to the phenomenon of paramilitarism (p.77) as well as to 
guarantee the enactment of measures necessary to protect human rights defenders 
during the implementation of the accord (pp.78, 82). Hence, a special unit is expected to 
lead investigations on the links between criminal successor organisations of the 
paramilitaries and the state’s civil servants (p.85). Moreover, the government is required 
to initiate the legislative process to prohibit the promotion or financing of paramilitary 
structures while including mechanisms to prosecute violations of these provisions into 
the constitution (p.80).         
 The provision coming closest to the envisioned vetting of armed forces, again 
forming part of the special unit, states that said unit “will propose mechanisms for the 
background check of public servants in all state institutions with the purpose of 
verifying any involvement these might have had with groups and/or activities of 
paramilitarism or human right violations”48 (p.82) in order to guarantee the no repetition 
of the phenomenon of paramilitarism (pp.39, 83). To achieve this aim, the national 
government is expected to initiate legislative reforms needed to sanction political parties 
and their candidates to be found guilty of cooperating with criminal networks including 
those stemming from former paramilitary groups (p.96). To this end, former members 
of paramilitary groups are invited to join the commission on clarification, coexistence 
and no repetition as part of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP Spanish acronym) to 
contribute to the process of illuminating the phenomenon of paramilitarism (p.171). The 
investigations are aimed at establishing penal responsibility of the persons involved in 
criminal networks originating in a paramilitary past (p.85). Furthermore, the 
commission’s mandate, is supposed to achieve the prosecution of paramilitary successor 
organisations, especially with regard to systematic violence committed against women 
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 “Propondrá los mecanismos para la revisión de antecedentes de los servidores/as públicos en 
todas las instituciones del Estado con el fin de verificar cualquier involucramiento que hayan 
tenido los anteriores con grupos y/o actividades de paramilitarismo o violaciones de Derechos 
Humanos“ 
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in particular (p.83).         
 Nonetheless, no remarks related to vetting any actors involved with paramilitary 
activities and more specifically with regard to conflict-related sexual violence as 
envisioned in the WPS indicators are to be found. This is not surprising due to the deep 
entrenchment of paramilitaries, BACRIMS, and the state’s armed forces. Dismissing 
allegations that his ministry had been aware of paramilitary groups establishing a 
presence in territories designated as pre-assembly sites for the demobilizing FARC 
fighters, Defence Minister Luis Carlos Villegas went as far as announcing that “there is 
no paramilitarism in Colombia”49, as arguing otherwise “would mean granting political 
recognition to bandits dedicated to common or organised delinquency”50 (Colprensa, 
2017). Downplaying this problem, however, is dangerous. The failure of the 
government to acknowledge its responsibility in facilitating the human rights violations 
committed by the paramilitaries or by its own armed forces will only prolong the 
conflict. One telling example of this is the falsos positivos scandal. State-armed forces 
carried out extrajudicial killings of civilians during the period of 2002-2008 and dressed 
the corpses in the uniforms of guerrilla fighters in order to boost up numbers of combat 
fatalities and collect rewards. Research suggests that awareness of this practice reached 
up to the highest levels of the Colombian military (HRW, 2015).  
Subsequently, when looking at the situation of keeping up command 
responsibility and the measures undertaken by civilian and military leaders to sensitise 
their troops or the general population more broadly on the topic of sexual violence, the 
picture remains bleak. In the past, these leaders, have successfully avoided punishment 
for a significant number of crimes committed in relation to the armed conflict
51
 and 
have largely succeeded in promoting a very light version of command responsibility.
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In Colombia, sexual related crimes have an impunity rate of 98 per cent which 
contributes to a significant extent to the repetition of these crimes (ABColombia, 2013).  
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 “En Colombia no hay paramilitarismo”  
50
 “significaría otorgar un reconocimiento político a unos bandidos dedicados a la delincuencia común u 
organizada” 
51
 For a discussion on the demobilization process of the paramilitaries and the TJ measures they faced see 
for example Monteiro Dario, 2015 
52
 From an interview with a lawyer working at Women’s Link Worldwide, 30.3.17 
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5.3 Pillar III - Protection  
Table 4. Protection (of both the rights and bodies of women). 
 
Indicator Resolution Description Compliance 
3.1 1325 Protection of women’s and girls’ human 
rights 
 
3.2 2106 Address sexual violence concerns with 
regard to: justice sector reform 
 
3.3 1820 Protection of women and girls in imminent 
threat of sexual violence 
 
3.4 1325 Measures to protect women and girls from 
gender-based violence (all forms of sexual 
abuse and violence) 
 
3.5 2106 Include sexual violence in definition of acts 
prohibited by ceasefires and in provisions 
for ceasefire monitoring 
 
3.6 2106 Address sexual violence concerns with 
regard to: DDR 
 
 
3.7 2106 Address sexual violence concerns with 
regard to: SSR 
 
 
 
Compliance 
In the context of indicator 3.1, references to the need to protect both the rights and 
bodies of women are numerous in the final peace agreement, and the influence of 
women’s rights organisations on the drafting becomes visible. Often these references 
are to be found in the context of discussing gender-based or sexual violence, and on 
many occasions intersect with the pillar of ‘relief and recovery’. The agreement 
successfully distinguishes between different kinds of women, and instead of focusing on 
‘women’ in general, it singles out the ones in need of special protection such as rural 
women, women belonging to the LGBTI community, female heads of households, 
social movement leaders, and women’s rights organisations. Protection of their physical 
and psychological integrity is regarded paramount in ensuring their effective 
participation in the social and political life of their communities (pp.40, 86). The 
category ‘women and children’, which has been criticised as simply lumping together 
two distinct issues depicting women as vulnerable and neglecting their contributions as 
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agents of change, is not particularly prevalent in the peace agreement. Some of these 
references are to be found (for example: pp.12, 128, 144, 187) but the gender focus of 
the agreement stretches beyond ‘women and children’ in need of protection.   
 In the part of the agreement discussing the conditions governing the end of the 
conflict, the gender focus is described as putting a “special emphasis on the protection 
of women, girls, boys, and adolescents”53 and thereby “will take into account the 
specific risks which women face against their life, liberty, integrity and security”54 and 
that the measures therefore will be designed “adequately for said risks”55 (p.79). This 
approach to the ‘special needs’ of women due to their ‘particular vulnerability’ can be 
observed throughout all six parts of the accord (see for example: pp.12, 54, p.134). 
These ‘special needs’ refer, among others, to special needs of nutrition (p.11) or the 
special risks they face due to the “feminine condition”56 of their health (p.258). Women 
and the human rights violations they have endured over the course of the fighting take 
other forms “such as sexual violence, the psychological effects, or simply the co-
existence with fear”57 (p.126). However, they might be “less visible but not less 
painful”58(ibid).   
Closely related to this is indicator 3.2, dealing with addressing sexual violence 
concerns with regard to the reform of the country’s justice sector. Whereas a complete 
overhaul of this sector is not deemed necessary, shortcomings with regard to how 
crimes of sexual violence are handled can be observed. The final peace agreement seeks 
to take this into consideration when establishing the Special Jurisdiction whose basic 
principles point towards the special situation of women and victims of sexual violence. 
Generally speaking, however, the gap between theory and practice in the Colombian 
context renders assessing compliance with the majority of indicators listed above 
problematic. When looking at the peace agreement alone, few of the requirements are 
met. Including some of the previous laws enacted to protect and compensate the victims 
of sexual violence, nonetheless, makes the situation of Colombian women appear better 
only on paper. While there is no lack of judicial means and initiatives to address the 
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 “especial énfasis en la protección de mujeres, niñas, niños y adolescentes” 
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 “tendrá en cuenta los riesgos específicos que enfrentan las mujeres contra su vida, libertad, integridad y 
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 “sus necesidades específicas, así como los riesgos propios de su condición femenina” 
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 “como la violencia sexual, las afectaciones psicológicas, o la simple convivencia con el miedo” 
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 “menos visibles pero no menos dolorosas” 
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issue of violence against women, their implementation remains flawed. One example of 
this is indicator 3.4, which deals with measures to protect women and girls from gender-
based violence. While a number of laws to protect women exist, such as the Order 092 
issued by the Colombian Constitutional Court, acknowledging the particular 
vulnerability of rural women especially with regard to crimes of sexual violence, 
implementation rates are low which reinforces the overall climate of impunity 
accompanying these crimes (ABColombia, 2013).  
 
Non-Compliance   
Regarding indicator 3.5 which strives for the inclusion of sexual violence in the 
definition of acts prohibited by ceasefires and in provisions for ceasefire monitoring, no 
explicit mention of this issue is to be found in neither the preliminary General 
Agreement on the termination of the conflict and building of a stable and lasting peace 
signed by the FARC and the Santos government in Havana in 2012 (Gobierno Nacional 
& FARC, 2016) nor the final version of the peace agreement of November 2016 (p.58). 
A lack of compliance also concerns indicators 3.6 and 3.7 covering the need to address 
sexual violence concerns with regard to DDR and security sector reform (SSR) 
respectively. In Colombia, trust in the state’s security forces is low and their 
involvement in acts of sexual violence further deteriorates their relationship with the 
general population (Hörtner, 2013).        
 Whereas the state’s security forces are expected to protect the population, they 
do not live up to their responsibility and Colombia’s Human Rights Ombudsman 
clarifies that “even if cases of sexual violence against women perpetrated by the 
Security Forces do not correspond to a war strategy (…), they constitute a generalised 
practice that takes advantage of the conditions of subordination of women, their 
precarious economic conditions resulting from lack of protection by the State, and the 
acceptance of existing ideas in the local culture, such as a woman’s body is an object 
that belongs to men” (as cited in ABColombia, 2013, pp.1-2). Since 2010, according to 
the Ministry of Defence, an official zero tolerance policy for this kind of behaviour 
exists. However, the UN deems the ministry’s approach inadequate as sanctions are not 
enforced effectively thereby contributing to the overall climate of impunity with regard 
to crimes of sexual violence. SSR is therefore often considered crucial to regain the 
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population’s trust and enable lasting conflict resolution as the “failure to engage in 
vetting, including for sexual and gender-based crimes, puts societies at risk of further 
violence from dangerous actors, constitutes a significant barrier to seeking justice 
assistance from the State, erodes public faith and confidence in rule-of-law institutions, 
marginalizes victims and sends the message that gender-based and sexual violence is 
socially acceptable” (UN Global Study, 2015, p.179). The state’s police and military 
forces’ compliance, however, is instrumental for protecting and advancing economic 
interests of the country’s political elites, therefore rendering the deeply needed SSR one 
of the most sensitive issues in relation to the country’s current peace building process. 
SSR in Colombia is highly controversial and “the fact that the Ministry of Defence 
refuses to talk about SSR […] is suggestive”59 and so highlights “the urgency of a 
public debate on this touchy subject”60 (Tickner, 2017). 
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 “El hecho de que el MDN se rehúsa a hablar de RSS [...]es sugerente” 
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 “la urgencia de un debate público sobre este quisquilloso tema” 
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5.4 Pillar IV - Relief and Recovery  
Table 5. Relief and Recovery (for conflict survivors, particularly survivors of sexual 
violence in conflict) 
Indicator Resolution Description Compliance 
4.1 2106 Address sexual violence in armed conflict 
in mediation efforts, ceasefires, and peace 
agreements and include women, women’s 
organisations, and survivors of sexual 
violence in the process  
 
4.2 1889 Collection of data on and analysis and 
assessment of  particular needs of women 
and girls in post-conflict situations 
 
4.3 1820 End impunity, exclude from amnesty 
provisions, and prosecute those 
responsible for sexual violence  
 
4.4 2242 Access to justice for women in (post-) 
conflict situations including reparations 
for victims of sexual and gender-based 
violence 
 
4.5 1325 Gender perspective in peace agreement 
negotiations and implementation with 
regard to issues of repatriation, 
resettlement, rehabilitation, and 
reintegration 
 
4.6 1888 Access to health care, psychosocial 
support, legal assistance and socio 
economic reintegration services for 
victims of sexual violence, in particular 
in rural areas 
 
4.7 2106 Provide sustainable assistance to women 
and girls living with or affected by HIV 
and AIDS in (post-)conflict situations 
 
 
Compliance   
Indicator 4.1 seeks to raise awareness of sexual violence in armed conflict in mediation 
efforts, ceasefires, and peace agreements while including women, women’s 
organisations, and survivors of sexual violence in the process. Since the accord’s 
provisions regarding sexual violence have been discussed in previous pillars, this 
pillar’s first indicator focuses more on the role of the victims during the peace process 
and drafting of the agreement. Moreover, whereas the inclusion of women’s 
organisations into the process has been discussed already with regard to Pillar I, 
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victims’ organisations also played an integral part in the process. Consequently, the 
accord acknowledges that more than 3000 victims participated in four forums 
throughout Colombia organised by the UN and 70 victims travelled to Havana to testify 
before the official negotiators to offer their recommendations and personal insights on 
the victims’ needs. Overall, more than 17,000 suggestions were handed in by victims of 
the conflict to the official peace talk delegations in Havana following what later became 
of core importance to the final peace agreement namely that “the redress of the victims 
has to be at the centre of any agreement”61(p.126).       
 The Colombian state, furthermore, in the form of Law 1448 of 2011, known as 
the Victims and Land Restitution Law, has not only “acknowledged responsibility for 
victims’ well-being” but has “recognized them as rights holders” (Dixon, 2016, p.16); it 
has registered close to 16 percent of the country’s population as official victims of the 
internal armed conflict and so entitled to assistance and reparations. Victim eligibility to 
compensation is not based on the identity of the perpetrator but on the fact whether the 
damage has been caused by the internal conflict in general. In the long run, this serves 
to create a society in which “co-existence consists not in the mere sharing of the same 
social and political space but instead in the creation of a transformative environment 
which allows for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the creation of the broadest 
culture of respect and tolerance”62 (p.131). In the end, this “will promote an 
environment of dialogue and will create spaces in which the victims see themselves 
dignified, in which individual and collective recognition of responsibility will take 
place, and in general, respect and confidence [...] the equality of opportunities between 
men and women [...] will consolidate themselves”63 (ibid). The conclusion is drawn that 
with “the construction of a peace based on truth” 64  as the ultimate goal “the 
understanding and recognition of a bloody past has to be taken on in order to be 
overcome”65 (ibid).          
 The end of the conflict is considered “a unique opportunity to satisfy one of the 
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 “el resarcimiento de las víctimas debería estar en el centro de cualquier acuerdo” 
62
 “la convivencia no consiste en el simple compartir de un mismo espacio social y político, sino en 
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greatest desires of the Colombian society and of the victims in particular: that the truth 
about what happened during the conflict be clarified and known. Colombia needs to 
know what happened, and what should never happen again [...] to finally break the 
cycles of violence which have characterized the history of Colombia”66 (p.130). This 
desire to know the truth and to understand what has occurred during the decades of 
conflict cuts through all layers of Colombian society and needs to be addressed 
satisfactorily if the country is to move on. When asked during a seminar on German and 
Colombian lieux de memoire organised by the Goethe Institute in Bogotá on March 17, 
2017, if the people in Colombia grew tired of constantly discussing the conflict, and 
would instead prefer to stress other parts of the country’s history such as its diverse 
indigenous traditions, participants pointed out that the situation in Colombia was not 
comparable to the one in Germany. Everything which had happened during the 
Holocaust had been revealed and discussed critically: “In Colombia we are still 
searching for the truth”. One of my interview partners stressed something similar by 
stating that “sometimes all the victims need to know is why it happened”.67 
Consequently, the measures of reparation are to be designed in close cooperation with 
victims’ organisations and are supposed to “respond to the expectations of the victims 
of the conflict […] avoid revictimisation and empower the victims”68 (p.178).  
 In order for these measures to meet the actual needs of victims, collecting data 
on women’s and girls’ particular needs in post-conflict situations is essential. 
Compliance with this requirement is requested by this pillar’s indicator 4.2. This 
practice is considered important, as gender is often rendered invisible in statistics and 
often a lack of awareness, with regard to the specific challenges women face, persists. 
This lack of data then results in the design and implementation of policies not tailored 
towards the actual needs of the female parts of a post-conflict population. The accord 
seeks to mitigate this shortcoming by, for example, tackling the issue of electoral 
participation of the most vulnerable people by “promoting a broad gender-focused  
participatory exercise of analysis on the obstacles these populations encounter when 
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 From an interview with a lawyer working at Women’s Link Worldwide, 30.3.17 
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exercising their right to vote, and adopt the corresponding measures”69 (p.51) and more 
precisely with regard to the situation of women: “This system will include specific 
information on the risks and threats against the participation and political, social, and 
communal representation of women”70 (p.40). The work of the very first Women’s 
Truth and Memory Commission convened by Ruta Pacífica in December 2013 
constitutes an early example of this gathering of information.     
 A significant step to end impunity and exclude crimes of sexual violence from 
amnesty provisions, as envisioned in this pillar’s indicator 4.3, has been made with the 
recent establishment of the JEP and Truth Commission to enable the victims of the 
conflict to find closure with their suffering during decades of conflict: “it’s a huge 
opportunity for women to get justice”71 as it is the first time a commission like this 
exists in a formal setting. What distinguishes the Special Jurisdiction from the normal 
jurisdiction is its unique approach to sanction “which includes the restriction of liberty, 
but adopts a reparatory and restorative approach” including for instance “measures such 
as: participation in victim reparation programs, environmental protection, infrastructure 
construction and reparation, implementation of rural development programs, and 
removal and cleaning of explosive war remains and antipersonnel mines” (Sanchez 
Leon, 2016, p.175). However, this applies only to those who have actively participated 
in the JEP’s truth component thereby acknowledging their personal responsibility. In a 
similar manner, “the fight against impunity”72 and the “measures of clarification of the 
truth and of reparation [...] are required to contribute to the prevention [...] of new 
violations, and is a fundamental guarantee for the no repetition of violations [...] of the 
definitive termination of the violence under which the country has suffered because of 
the conflict”73 (p.187). References to women’s special status can be found when 
discussing the question of reparations especially for the survivors of conflict-related 
sexual violence (p.193), with no references to men or boys as victims of sexual violence 
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 “Promover un ejercicio ampliamente participativo de diagnóstico con enfoque de género, de los 
obstáculos que enfrentan estas poblaciones en el ejercicio del derecho al voto, y adoptar las medidas 
correspondientes” 
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 “Este sistema incluirá información específica sobre los riesgos y amenazas contra la participación y la 
representación política, social y comunitaria de las mujeres” 
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 From an interview with a lawyer working at Women’s Link Worldwide, 30.3.17 
72
 “la lucha contra la impunidad” 
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to be found.           
 In accordance with the indicator 4.3, rape and other forms of sexual violence, are 
excluded from amnesty provisions (pp.151, 295) and prosecution for these crimes is 
rendered impossible to avoid - theoretically speaking (pp.304-8). Consequently, the 
perpetrators of crimes related to any form of sexual violence are excluded from the 
alternative sanctions established by the JEP thereby fulfilling both indicator 4.3 as well 
as Colombia’s obligations under international law and the Rome Statute (pp. 104, 304-
8). The basic principles of the section dealing with establishing the JEP, moreover, state 
that the consequences for committing human rights violations are to be stronger when 
those violations have been committed against women (p.144). While certainly drafted 
with the aim of raising awareness and achieving justice, an approach like this bears the 
danger of establishing a hierarchy of victims which might, in the end, complicate the 
process of reconciliation. Hence, Ruta Pacífica raises similar concerns and stresses that 
from their point of view there should be no hierarchy of suffering and efforts should be 
directed at combating all types of violations of women’s rights and bodies. 
Consequently, it is not considered advisable to single out sexual violence as worse than 
other types of violence.
74
       
 Looking at the establishment of the JEP from a more critical angle, however, one 
could argue that it risks sending a “contradictory message to society and victims: while 
increasing penalties in the ordinary justice system for comparable actions [...] the 
transitional justice mechanisms will involve a more drastic diminution, than the 
increases demanded for in the ordinary justice system. Consequently, the victims will 
receive the message that their damage will be recognised as more or less grave 
according to who the author of the crime is, at the same time, the aggressor will 
understand that in any case it will be better to have committed a crime while having 
declared oneself belonging to an armed group”75 (Casmujer, 2013, p.13). Despite 
potential shortcomings, the JEP is considered crucial in any efforts dedicated to end the 
                                                     
74
 From an interview with a representative of Ruta Pacífica, 24.3.17  
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 “un mensaje contradictorio hacia la sociedad y hacia las víctimas: Al mismo tiempo que se incrementa 
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más o menos grave de acuerdo a la calidad del autor y al mismo tiempo el agresor entenderá que en todo 
caso será mejor para sí el haber cometido un crimen habiéndose declarado perteneciente a un grupo 
armado” 
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culture of impunity surrounding crimes related to sexual violence (p.8) and a special 
unit composed of both men and women is to be set up to investigate these cases (p.169). 
Whereas one can welcome that the final peace agreement refers to the fight against 
impunity on several occasions (pp.39, 127, 187), it remains to be seen whether these 
provisions will translate into tangible results.       
 Reparations and access to justice, as described in indicator 4.4, constitute one 
possibility to deliver these tangible results for the victims of the armed conflict and 
form an integral part of any TJ regime. The end of the conflict is described as a unique 
window of opportunity “to materialise the victims’ rights to truth, justice, reparation and 
no repetition and in general to guarantee complete fulfilment of human rights of 
everyone in Colombia, including women’s rights”76 (p.189, emphasis added). 
Transitional Justice as defined by the UN deals with “the full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of 
large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability serves justice and achieves 
reconciliation” (UNSC, 2004). Reparations can broadly be defined as “measures 
provided by a wrongdoing party out of obligation to redress the harm caused to an 
injured party” (Dixon, 2016, p.89) and are not necessarily restricted to materialistic 
measures: “for victims, justice is an experience. It is as much about the way that they 
are treated, consulted and respected procedurally throughout the reparation process, as it 
is about the substantive remedy, material or otherwise, they may be granted as part of 
the end result” (REDRESS as cited in Dixon, 2016, p.99).      
 What makes the Colombian case special is the central role victims got to play 
during the entire process, swiftly combining assistance with reparation measures in 
what Peter Dixon (2016) terms a “subsistence model”. This model is based on state 
responsibility and seeks to first stabilize the situation of the victims for them “to achieve 
a level of basic subsistence” (p.103), to be better suited to fully appreciate the following 
reparation measures, which aim at promoting a culture of reconciliation, “because 
reparations are seen as more transformative than assistance and because victims must 
attain a certain level of stability to receive reparations measures” (Dixon, 2016, p.103). 
Reparations are defined as “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
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 “para materializar los derechos de las víctimas a la verdad, la justicia, la reparación y la no repetición, y 
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guarantees of non-repetition”, whereas assistance is defined as “measures to fulfil 
immediate needs for food, medicine and housing [...] to help victims achieve a more 
stable life situation” and to help them “fulfil their rights to access truth, justice and 
reparation”. Accordingly, the Colombian state has provided 473 257 victims with 
reparation payments and 1 184 418 with assistance (Dixon, 2016, p.94).  
 While the successful implementation of reparation programmes face certain 
obstacles such as “high expenses, the need to gather potentially unavailable evidence, 
the pain associated with cross-examination and victims’ lack of confidence in judicial 
systems still untransformed by political transition” these problems of effectively 
reaching out to victims are exacerbated for female victims and “for some victims who 
are more likely to be female than male, such as the victims of sexual violence” (Rubio-
Marín & de Greiff, 2007, p.322). The warring parties in the Colombian conflict have 
sought to address this issue and have structured the peace process between them in a 
way that puts an emphasis on a restorative approach to justice instead of focusing on 
retribution. For the current peace efforts to stand a chance, it is required “that the 
society would know everything that happened, how it happened, why it happened and 
who did it [...] so that they would realize that neither rebellion nor the defence of 
democracy nor anti-communism justify much of what they have done and, above all, 
that they account themselves for their actions before the millions of civilians who they 
have made endure the whole list of crimes of the Rome Statute”77 (Sierra Restrepo, 
2017). Consequently, the accord points out that these reparations have to be designed in 
correspondence with UN guidelines as well as with the gender focus, taking into 
account the particular suffering of women (p.144). 
                                                     
77
 “Que la sociedad toda sepa qué pasó, cómo pasó, por qué pasó y quién lo hizo [...] para que reconozcan 
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Figure 4. The Centre of Memory, Reconciliation and Peace, Bogotá; source: author. 
Correspondingly, the indicator 4.5 aims at introducing a gender perspective in peace 
agreement negotiations and the agreements’ implementation with regard to issues of 
repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Again, assessing compliance 
with this indicator is rendered difficult due to the timing of the research and no definite 
conclusions can be drawn. However, some provisions are found in the accord with 
regard to the rural and displaced populations’ needs as well as to matters of their 
reintegration and rehabilitation. Hence, the accord notes the need to “broaden and 
improve the access and the offer in care and qualified assistance [...] including treatment 
and rehabilitation and [...] among others, affirmative measures for women”78 (p.119). 
Moreover, the accord notes that every national plan related to collective reparations, 
under which the issues of repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration fall, 
will have a gender focus and will be directed, among others, at women’s organisations 
(p.180). The government, furthermore, promises to “increase the coverage and improve 
the quality of strategies of communal rehabilitation for the reconstruction of the social 
fabric [...] re-establishing the trust between public authorities and communities, and 
promote the co-existence within communities including the victims, ex-members of 
paramilitary organisations, members of the FARC in the process of reincorporation into 
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tratamiento y la rehabilitación, y [...], entre otros, medidas afirmativas para las mujeres” 
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civilian life”79(pp.181-2) with all the resulting strategies to incorporate a gender focus. 
The government, hence, will take measures to strengthen communal human rights 
defenders “with the aim that these will accompany in an effective manner the process of 
land return, return and relocation of displaced persons and victims abroad, including 
refugees and persons living in exile”80 (p.184) including victims’ organisations in the 
design and implementation process. Overall, the “gender focus will have to be 
understood and applied in a crosscutting manner which covers the accord’s 
implementation in its entirety”81 (p.194). Order 092 and Law 1448 go hand in hand with 
this approach and the goals set out in indicator 4.5. These two judicial means already 
existed prior to the final peace agreement to tackle the various challenges displaced 
women face, paying particular attention to the issue of sexual violence to which this 
group of women is particularly exposed.      
 Indicator 4.6 deals with the important issues of providing women with access to 
health care, psychosocial support, legal assistance, and socio economic reintegration 
services for victims of sexual violence especially in rural areas. With regard to health 
and psychosocial care, the accord calls for “the adoption of a differentiated gender focus 
which is to take into account the health requirements of women in correspondence with 
their life cycle, including measures on sexual and reproductive health, psychosocial care 
and special measures for pregnant women”82 (p.26). With regard to the additional 
vulnerability of the rural population, the accord, furthermore, calls for the creation of a 
model specifically dedicated to improving public health in rural locations (ibid). The 
beneficiaries of this process therefore “will receive technical and financial support for 
the reconstruction of their lives and income generation strategies”83 (p.184). Similarly, 
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 “aumentar la cobertura y elevar la calidad de las estrategias de rehabilitación comunitaria para la 
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women’s rights organisations, among others, are to receive legal and technical 
assistance in their work (p.43).       
 Related to victims’ psychological needs, the national government commits to 
“improve the quality of psychosocial care for the emotional recovery of the victims 
according to the specific damage they have suffered, among these the particularly 
affected victims of sexual violence”84 (p.181). Consequently, more local care centres for 
victims are to be established in order for the government to strengthen “the access to 
services of mental health for the victims who require so”85 (ibid). In 2012, moreover, 
the Ministry of Health adopted a set of protocols aimed at establishing comprehensive 
health care for the victims of sexual violence. These protocols, however, fall short of 
incorporating guidelines matching the particular needs of victims of conflict-related 
sexual violence. Shortcomings with regard to the accessibility of these programmes are 
also present, as the majority of victims affected by these crimes are located in areas of 
conflict and, apart from that, tend to lack awareness of their rights to compensation and 
support. Implementation of these protocols therefore remains weak and many women 
resort to the help of women’s organisations in order to receive the therapeutic help they 
need (ABColombia, 2013). 
Non-Compliance 
Regarding the indicator 4.7 dedicated to providing sustainable assistance to women and 
girls living with or otherwise affected by HIV and AIDS in post-conflict situations, only 
a single reference can be found in the final peace agreement. This reference, 
furthermore, is directed at the female prison population and therefore does not 
incorporate all women affected by HIV/AIDS (p.118).     
 After having established to what extent the indicators as set out by the SC’s 
eight Resolutions on WPS are present in the final peace agreement between the Santos 
government and the FARC, as well as some of the resulting DDR and TJ measures, the 
following section aims to discussing these finding critically. Moreover, the subsequent 
section follows the purpose of discussing more broadly the role of UNSCR 1325, in 
particular within the context of the latest Colombian peace process. Additionally, some 
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outlook is provided on the relevance of the Colombian approach to conflict resolution in 
the global context as well as on the main challenges that persist in the accord’s 
successful implementation and the establishment of a durable peace. 
5.5 Discussion: To what Extent does the Colombian Peace Process reflect the WPS 
Framework? 
The Colombian peace process between the Santos government and the FARC reflects 
the UN’s WPS framework both on a theoretical and practical level. With regard to the 
former, the UN’s official discourses centred on the role of women in conflict and peace 
building are present in the Colombian case. With regard to the latter, applying the WPS 
indicators to the agreement and the TJ measures surrounding it, shows that the content 
and weighting of the framework’s four pillars is reflected in the latest Colombian peace 
process. Consequently, all four WPS pillars are present in the final peace agreement 
between the Santos government and the FARC albeit with attention being skewed 
towards the pillars of ‘participation’ and ‘relief and recovery’. Out of the four pillars, 
the smallest amount of attention has been dedicated to designing strategies of 
‘prevention’ and measures of ‘protection’. This goes hand in hand with the observation 
of a respondent to the civil society survey for the UN’s Global Study on 1325 according 
to whom “the transformative potential of the WPS agenda has not been fulfilled, and 
this has to do as well with far too little focus on prevention and long-term structural 
change in societies” (UN Global Study, 2015, p.213). 
 With respect to Pillar I, directed at enhancing women’s participation in conflict 
and peace building processes, the UN’s WPS framework is reflected in the Colombian 
case to the extent that it led to more women being actively involved in the official 
Havana peace talk delegations, the negotiations, and the drafting of the final agreement, 
as well as in the accord’s implementation process. This enhanced female presence 
resulted in the establishment of a gender sub-commission, which then allowed for the 
adoption of a special gender focus to the final peace accord. Another similarity to be 
found between the Resolutions comprising the WPS framework and the Colombian 
final peace agreement is the vagueness of formulations. While ‘participation of women’ 
is identified as essential to the peace process and a successful post-conflict 
reconstruction of Colombia’s society, a lack of a clear definition of ‘participation of 
women in the Colombian context’, poses a challenge for women’s rights organisations 
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tasked with incorporating a gender perspective into the laws designed to implement the 
accord.
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Pillar II of the WPS agenda is not as strongly represented in the Colombian case 
as Pillar I. This pillar deals with the issue of prevention by designing strategies to 
combat violence against women as well as by ensuring an inclusive DDR process, 
engaging in efforts to debunk myths fuelling sexual violence, and initiating measures to 
sensitise troops on this matter. These aspects are considered crucial to create a post-
conflict society in which women can participate equally and safely. Nonetheless, as 
demonstrated by the previous analysis, this pillar faces noticeable shortcomings. While 
provisions for making the DDR process more gender sensitive form part of the 
agreement, the actual transitional zones in which FARC fighters are to disarm are, for 
instance, not gender segregated. Where the gender focus falls short, is that it equates 
‘gender’ mainly with ‘women’ and thereby fails to acknowledge the relational nature of 
the concept.           
 Putting an explicit emphasis on protecting and strengthening women is what 
renders this agreement significant, but this aim cannot be achieved by excluding men. 
While not mentioned explicitly, men seem to be part of the problems women face, for 
instance in the form of domestic violence, but are rarely portrayed as an essential part of 
the solution. Consequently, there is a lack of focus with regard to how different 
masculinities are constructed and a greater emphasis could be put on the topic of 
prevention if the underlying attitudes of a society as macho as the Colombian one are to 
be approached effectively. Gender and the militarisation of society cannot be discussed 
in isolation from each other and light needs to be shed on these constructions as 
underlying causes fuelling conflict and violence. In relation to that, failing to engage in 
activities to sensitise the state’s own armed forces, as well as the demobilising fighters 
of paramilitary groups in particular, to the issue of conflict-related sexual violence, can 
be considered one of the main spoilers for potential conflict resolution and 
reconciliation.  
Pillar III, aimed at ensuring the protection of women’s rights and bodies, 
experiences similar shortcomings to Pillar II. Whereas commitments to this goal are 
found throughout the accord, the Colombian state has mainly paid lip service so far to 
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their fulfilment. While a number of laws exist to protect women from dangers such as 
conflict-related sexual violence or femicide, their implementation remains flawed. The 
result is an environment characterised by impunity and on-going violations of women’s 
rights and bodies. Consequently, the failure to include commitments to conduct a 
profound SSR into the final peace agreement leaves one of the core WPS indicators 
unfulfilled. The persistence of paramilitary structures, moreover, is detrimental to any 
efforts of leaving conflict in Colombia behind for good as it hampers the 
implementation of any law designed to protect women’s bodies and rights. It is 
therefore up to the Colombian state to break up this nexus of paramilitarism in order for 
the measures set out in the peace agreement to bear fruit. Whereas some level of 
acknowledgement of the problem of paramilitarism can be observed, Pillar III’s 
presence in its entirety in the Colombian case remains weak. The WPS agenda’s 
presence, however, increases again with regard to the final pillar. 
The strong presence of Pillar IV in the final peace agreement, covering matters 
of relief and recovery, can certainly be explained by the high involvement of women’s 
rights advocates and victims’ representatives in the process of drafting the agreement. 
Most importantly to note here are the exclusion of crimes of conflict-related sexual 
violence from amnesty provisions as well as the exceptional way in which the victims 
of the conflict have had the opportunity to take part in the negotiations and drafting of 
the agreement. This goes hand in hand with earlier efforts made by the Colombian state 
to compensate the victims of the conflict and will prove essential in making the 
envisioned peace sustainable. The overall development to be noted with regard to all 
four pillars, is that the involvement of women in the official stages of the peace process 
has increased steadily over time. Whereas continuously active in the background, 
Colombian women’s rights organisations, due to the insistence of the UN in Colombia, 
have managed to increase their participation also with respect to the formal side to the 
negotiations. While the initial agreement to end the conflict between the Santos 
government and the FARC of August 2012 did not mention women at all, the final 
accord can be considered significantly more inclusive. 
Language-wise, it is interesting to note that the demands raised by women’s 
rights organisations to incorporate the female versions of specific words into the 
accord’s formulations, were included. Consequently, the document speaks of 
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promotores/as of peace or campesinos/as. The category ‘women’, moreover, within the 
accord, encompasses a variety of women and a distinction is being made between rural 
women, Afro-Colombian women, elderly women, and indigenous women, with the 
particular vulnerability of these groups being pointed out on numerous occasions. 
Language bears power and one example for this is the fact that when comparing both 
versions of the peace accord, two important formulations were changed following 
pressure exerted by the NO-camp: the expressions ‘gender’, ‘sexual orientation’ and 
‘diverse gender identity’ were replaced by the term ‘belonging to groups in condition of 
vulnerability’. ‘Gender equality’, moreover, was replaced by ‘equality of opportunities 
between men and women’ (Sanchez A., 2016).      
 One of the biggest drawbacks of the agreement, nonetheless, is the vagueness of 
its provisions. Whereas peace agreements unavoidably constitute a compromise 
between the warring parties, the lack of clear definitions of what the proposed actions 
and measures in order to protect women or to encourage their political and economic 
participation are supposed to entail, leaves many aspects open to interpretation. 
Nevertheless, the peace agreement is not to be treated in isolation from other 
developments either. Peace processes in Colombia are manifold due to the diversity of 
actors involved in the conflict. Consequently, certain laws have been passed to address 
problems covered by the WPS indicators already prior to the signing of the final peace 
accord. Therefore, a lack of provisions in the agreement with regard to the UN’s 
indicators does not necessarily mean that the respective issue has been neglected 
entirely.  
Relating these findings to the theoretical background of this thesis, it can be 
noted that out of the three main discourses circulating at the UN on why and how 
women should take part in peace processes and conflict resolution, namely the main 
‘rights based’ discourse, as well as the two supplementary ‘special treatment rights’, 
and ‘contributor rights’ discourses, all three form part of the Colombian final peace 
accord. Hence, references to the participation of women in the Colombian case are both 
‘rights-based’ and ‘contributor based’, but without further clarifying what exactly 
renders their contributions valuable. The approach found in the Colombian final peace 
agreement is formulated in accordance with the ‘special treatment rights’ discourse 
present at UN levels, according to which a special emphasis on women and girls is 
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required, as the conflict affects them in a different manner owing to their perceived 
particular vulnerability. The inherent tension of the WPS framework between the pillars 
of ‘protection’ and ‘participation’ equally forms part of the final Colombian peace 
accord. On the one hand, women are characterised as belonging to the most vulnerable 
segments of the population and as victims of sexual violence in need of protection, 
entitled to compensations and justice as covered under Pillar IV. On the other hand, 
they are depicted as indispensable contributors to the strife for a lasting peace and full 
democracy as envisioned in Pillar I. While being a victim of sexual violence and acting 
as an agent for change are not mutually exclusive, the lack of clarity on this issue might 
send contradictory signals to law makers.       
 After discussing how the Colombian peace process between the Santos 
government and the FARC reflects the UN’s WPS agenda, it needs to be clarified to 
what extent this compliance can be explained by Colombian women’s rights 
organisations making active use of UNSCR 1325 or whether the attention dedicated to 
women’s rights in the current Colombian peace process can be explained by other 
factors. When asked about the role and importance of UN Women in Colombia during 
the interviews I conducted, consensus among the different organisations prevailed on 
how the contributions and support from UN Women Colombia proved to be paramount 
to ensure women’s participation in the official peace negotiations in Havana.   
 Answers to the questions as to the extent UNSCR 1325 constituted a helpful tool 
in pushing for their demands, however, opinions expressed by the interviewees differed. 
Not surprisingly, the representative of UN Women Colombia pointed out that UNSCR 
1325 constitutes an important normative point of orientation. She described it as a tool 
widely used by different women’s rights organisations to hold the government 
accountable with regard to its commitments under said Resolution as well as in order to 
make their demands heard.
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 Others were less optimistic about the impact of UNSCR 
1325 on Colombian law makers stating that members of Congress “would laugh to our 
faces” at the attempt of exercising pressure on them by referring to the Resolution. In 
this regard it turned out to be more helpful to gain the Congress members’ attention by 
means of framing women as potential voters in the next elections thereby promoting 
women more as a resource than putting attention on their rights of participation as 
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such.
88
 The conclusions drawn by the representative of Ruta Pacífica are somewhere in 
between describing 1325 as “a tool out of many without much power”. She notes, 
moreover, that there is no consensus among women’s organisations in Colombia as to 
how useful a tool the Resolution actually is. Whereas some make ample use of it in their 
daily efforts, others do not consider it particularly useful. She concludes that the current 
success in actively involving women’s rights organisations in the peace process is a 
result of their years of hard work. While the UN is considered an indispensable ally in 
these efforts, “we achieved so much more than 1325 envisioned”.89  
Overall, the UN has had a stable presence on the ground in Colombia for the 
past thirty years. During the peace process it has been indispensable as a mediator 
between the government and civil society as well as a facilitator of discussions and 
continues to offer ample technical and financial support.
90
 Moreover, UN Women 
Colombia, together with the Catholic Church, was responsible for enabling the journey 
of the delegation of victims to Havana. Therefore it can be summarised that external 
pressure as exercised by the UN on the negotiating parties accounts for a great deal of 
both women’s participation in the peace talks as well as the numerous references to their 
rights in the final peace agreement. From an international perspective in particular, the 
final peace accord has already been lauded as a success and a potential role model for 
other conflicts (Bell, 2016; Wucherpfennig, 2016; Maldonado, 2017). However, it needs 
to be taken into account that “given that research suggests that nearly half of agreements 
break down within five years, and more within a ten-year period, while many of the 
remainder enter a ‘no war, no peace’ limbo” (Bell, 2006, p.375).  
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Figure 5. A mural in Bogotá, which has a vibrant street art scene. This piece located close to the 
city centre addresses the issue of forced displacement of Colombia’s rural (indigenous) 
population; the inscription reads as “we are memory”; source: author. 
Colombia, nonetheless, could be regarded as having established the practice of a “slow 
drip process” (Bell, 2016, pp.166-7) which could turn out historically significant both 
within the country as well as abroad “as a contribution to a wider global peace-making 
practice where peace processes with particular armed groups, characterized at best as 
partial successes, can over time add up through gradual persistence and many stops, 
starts, phases, and mutations, to something approaching a comprehensive national 
political settlement” (ibid). Whereas viewed by some as an approach which might 
“dampen some conflicts and exacerbate others, their flaws can now also perhaps be 
understood to always inform the next stage of the process with regard to what a fuller 
peace would require” (ibid). This, however, constitutes a positive interpretation of the 
current process in which the upcoming hurdles are numerous and tricky; one of them 
being the upcoming 2018 presidential elections which will constitute a “key moment” in 
the process of the accord’s implementation phase also, given how divided the society in 
Colombia continues to be over the accord.
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 Other factors which could have an impact on the durability of an eventual peace 
in Colombia are the unstable political and economic situation in neighbouring 
                                                     
91
 From interviews with Ruta Pacífica, 24.3.17, UN Women Colombia, 28.3.17, Women’s Link 
Worldwide, 30.3.17, OIDHACO, 7.4.17 
80 
 
Venezuela; a country Colombia has entertained a strained relationship with. The 
emergence of new criminal groups in major Colombian cities like Bogotá, Medellín, 
and Cali constitutes an additional problem (Redacción Política, 2017). Safety outside 
the big cities, however, is deteriorating in a similar manner with opposition, political 
and social movement leaders, and human rights advocates continuing to be threatened, 
attacked, and assassinated.
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6. Conclusion 
Women’s participation in peace building processes has largely been neglected 
historically and from a scholarly perspective. In order to acknowledge the role women 
play in conflicts and conflict resolution, the UNSC has passed a set of eight Resolutions 
since the year 2000, with UNSCR 1325 being the founding document of what has 
become known as the UN’s agenda on Women, Peace and Security. Hence, in order to 
draw attention to the issue that conflicts affect women in a different way to men, and to 
lay the foundation for increasing their official participation in peace building initiatives, 
the UN has made it their aim to encourage and facilitate the meaningful inclusion of 
women in peace negotiations and peace agreement implementation processes. However, 
the WPS framework has also been criticised on grounds of its ineffectiveness or 
potentially counterproductive effects on women in conflict. Until the latest peace talks 
between the Santos government and the FARC which were taking place in Havana from 
2012 until 2016, previous Colombian peace processes did not differ from other peace 
talks with regard to excluding women, despite the high numbers of female guerrilla 
fighters, and the high share of female victims, especially in relation to crimes of 
conflict-related sexual violence and internal displacement. Taking into account more 
recent developments in international law, such as the establishment of the ICC under the 
Rome Statute as well as the aforementioned UN-led efforts to strengthen women’s 
position in peace talks and implementation phases, this thesis sought to shed light on the 
question as to what extent the UN’s WPS framework is reflected in the current 
Colombian peace process.         
 This serves the purpose of contributing to the growing body of literature on 
women and conflict. Moreover, it also deepens our understanding of the WPS 
framework’s effectiveness by investigating how far its provisions are found to manifest 
themselves in the contemporary peace building environment, using the current 
Colombian peace process as a case study. Subsequently, a set of indicators was directly 
derived from the eight Resolutions comprising the WPS framework in order to measure 
the final peace agreement’s compliance with the framework. Additionally, some of the 
TJ and DDR measures forming part of the current peace process have also been taken 
into account to complement the analysis. The timing of this research can be considered 
both an asset and a limitation. While it is highly up-to-date, the Colombian peace 
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process is only in its initial stage of implementation. This renders the assessment of the 
actual implications of the peace accord problematic to the extent that the findings are to 
be treated as preliminary results.        
 The findings of this thesis suggest that, with respect to the current Colombian 
peace process, compliance with the WPS framework is to be observed both related to 
the framework’s aims and its shortcomings. Results show that the weighting of the four 
pillars inherent to the framework, namely ‘participation’, ‘prevention’, ‘protection’, and 
‘relief and recovery’, is skewed towards Pillars I and IV. Increased attention therefore 
could be dedicated to matters of prevention and protection as envisioned by Pillars II 
and III. Apart from that, women’s participation is justified based on all three official 
discourses on women and peacebuilding circulating at the official UN level. With 
regard to the title of this thesis, namely whether the end of the conflict can be described 
as a window of opportunity for women in Colombia to enhance their rights, results are 
mixed. Up to this point, it is adequate to say that the latest Colombian peace process 
with the FARC has been relatively successful with respect to including women 
regardless of the challenges inherent to the implementation phase. This strong level of 
inclusiveness and the fact that the Colombian government and the FARC actively 
involved civil society organisations such as women’s and victims’ rights representatives 
is exemplary. Current developments, however, show that violence against women, 
especially toward female civil society activists, is increasing. This is not uncommon in 
post-conflict societies which are characterised by a tension between the wish to return to 
a state of stability associated with pre-conflict times and the desire of women to 
interlock the progress they accomplished during the conflict and the peace negotiations.  
 Colombia finds itself at a critical moment and several threats to the successful 
implementation of the final peace accord persist. As retired Major General Patrick 
Cammaert (2008), who served as UN Force Commander of the Eastern Division in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, states, “It has probably become more dangerous to 
be a woman than a soldier in armed conflict”. While substantial flaws to the 
implementation of the measures designed to protect women’s rights and bodies continue 
to persist in Colombia, the country’s current peace process and the final peace 
agreement it has produced can be considered successful in increasing women’s 
participation in conflict resolution efforts and a step in the direction of strengthening 
83 
 
women’s standing both in the political landscape of Colombia and with regard to future 
peace negotiations worldwide. 
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7. Appendix. 
Appendix 1. Interview Questions (original version) 
1. El conflicto armado y el papel de la mujer y de la ONU 
1.1 ¿Qué tan involucradas están las mujeres en el proceso de paz colombiano y cómo se 
expresa su participación? 
1.2 ¿Qué papel juega la ONU en el proceso de paz? 
1.3 ¿En qué medida constituye la Resolución 1325 de la ONU una herramienta por las 
organizaciones de mujeres para ejercer presión sobre el gobierno colombiano para que 
incluya a las mujeres en el proceso de paz? 
2. Desmovilización, desarme y reintegración 
2.1 ¿En qué medida están las medidas de desmovilización, desarme y reintegración 
separadas por género y adaptadas a las necesidades diferentes de las mujeres y de los 
hombres? 
2.2 ¿Cuáles son los mayores retos con respecto a la reintegración de ex-guerrilleras? 
3. Justicia transitoria 
3.1 ¿Cuáles son las medidas de justicia transitoria más importantes desde una 
perspectiva femenista? 
3.2 ¿Se hace justicia a las víctimas de la violencia sexual relacionada con el conflicto? 
4. Perspectivas de paz 
4.1 ¿Cuáles son las perspectivas de paz con el nuevo acuerdo depaz y qué papel 
desempeñan las elecciones de 2018? 
4.2 ¿Cuál es la actitud de la población respecto al acuerdo final de paz? 
4.3 ¿Cuál podría ser el significado del proceso de paz colombiano y el acuerdo final de 
paz por otros conflictos? ¿Podría ser un modelo a seguir (con respecto a la inclusión de 
las mujeres)? 
4.4 ¿Qué desafíos persisten? 
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Appendix 2. Interview questions (translated version) 
1. The armed conflict and the role of women and the UN 
1.1 How involved are women in the Colombian peace process and what does their 
participation look like? 
1.2 What role does the UN play in the peace process? 
1.3 To what extent does UN Resolution 1325 constitute a tool for women’s rights 
organisations to exercise pressure on the Colombian government to include women in 
the peace process? 
2. Demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration 
2.1 To what extent are the measures of demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration 
gender separated and adapted to the different needs of men and women? 
2.2 What are the main challenges with respect to the reintegration of female ex-guerrilla 
fighters? 
3. Transitional Justice 
3.1 What are the transitional justice measures which can be considered most important 
from a feminist perspective? 
 3.2 Are the victims of sexual violence related to the conflict done justice? 
4. Perspectives for peace 
4.1 What are the perspectives for peace with the new peace agreement and what role do 
the 2018 elections play? 
4.2 What is the attitude of the population towards the final peace accord? 
4.3 What could be the significance of the Colombian peace process and the final peace 
accord for other conflicts? Could it be a role model (with respect to the inclusion of 
women)? 
4.4 What challenges persist? 
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Appendix 3. Overview of the eight UNSC Resolutions of the WPS Framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
UNSCR 
1325 
2000 
"Urges Member States to 
ensure increased 
representation of women 
at all decision-making 
levels in national, regional 
and international 
institutions and 
mechanisms for the 
prevention, management, 
and resolution of conflict"  
UNSCR 
1820  
2008 
"Notes that rape and other 
forms of sexual violence can 
constitute a war crime, a 
crime against humanity, or a 
constitutive act with respect 
to genocide, stresses the need 
for the exclusion of sexual 
violence crimes from amnesty 
provisions in the context of 
conflict resolution processes . 
. . and stresses the importance 
of ending impunity for such 
acts as part of a 
comprehensive approach to 
seeking sustainable peace, 
justice, truth, and national 
reconciliation" 
UNSCR 
1888  
2009 
"Reiterates its demand for the 
complete cessation by all 
parties to armed conflict of all 
acts of sexual violence with 
immediate effect . . . including 
measures such as, inter alia, 
enforcing appropriate military 
disciplinary measures and 
upholding the principle of 
command responsibility, 
training troops on the 
categorical prohibition of all 
forms of sexual violence 
against civilians, debunking 
myths that fuel sexual 
violence and vetting 
candidates for national armies 
and security forces" 
UNSCR 
1889  
2009 
"Urges Member States, 
international and regional 
organisations to take further 
measures to improve 
women’s participation 
during all stages of peace 
processes, particularly in 
conflict resolution, post-
conflict planning and 
peacebuilding" 
UNSCR 
1960  
2010 
"Encourages the Secretary-
General to include in his 
annual reports submitted 
pursuant to resolutions 1820 
(2008) and 1888 (2009) 
detailed information on 
parties to armed conflict that 
are credibly suspected of 
committing or being 
responsible for acts of rape 
or other forms of sexual 
violence" 
UNSCR 
2106  
2013 
"Recognizes the need for more 
systematic monitoring of and 
attention to sexual violence in 
armed conflict and post-
conflict situations . . . in this 
regard, expresses its intent to 
employ, as appropriate, all 
means at its disposal to ensure 
women’s participation in all 
aspects of mediation, post-
conflict recovery and 
peacebuilding and to address 
sexual violence in conflict" 
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Appedix 3 (continued) 
 
 
 
  
UNSCR 2122  
2013 
"Recognizes the need for consistent 
implementation of resolution 1325 
(2000) in its own work and intends to 
focus more attention on women’s 
leadership and participation in 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding, 
including by monitoring progress in 
implementation, and addressing 
challenges linked to the lack and 
quality of information and analysis 
on the impact of armed conflict on 
women and girls, the role of women 
in peacebuilding and the gender 
dimensions of peace processes and 
conflict resolution" 
UNSCR 2242  
2015 
"Urges Member States, in light of 
the High-level Review, to assess 
strategies and resourcing in the 
implementation of the women, 
peace and security agenda, 
reiterates its call for Member States 
to ensure increased representation 
of women at all decision-making 
levels in national, regional and 
international institutions and 
mechanisms for the prevention, and 
resolution of conflict, encourages 
those supporting peace processes to 
facilitate women’s meaningful 
inclusion in negotiating parties’ 
delegations to peace talks" 
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Appedix 4. Information on Interview Partners. 
Casa de la Mujer is a human rights organisation, founded in 1982. With a focus on 
social justice oriented peacebuilding, it seeks to contribute to the defence and promotion 
of the human rights of women from a feminist perspective, strengthening of the rule of 
law, and democratic and inclusive peacebuilding in Colombia. Moreover, the 
organisation provides training, psychosocial assistance, legal aid and political advocacy 
services with the purpose of strengthening the women’s movement in Colombia as well 
as the victims’ movement in 20 departments around the country. My main task during 
the internship was to conduct research in order to contribute to the future proposals the 
organisation was going to make to the Colombian government with regard to 
implementing the accord’s gender focus correctly.     
 Ruta Pacífica is Colombia’s largest and internationally best known organisation 
fighting for women’s rights. While its headquarters are located in Bogotá, Ruta Pacífica 
is an alliance of over 300 women’s organisations throughout eight regions of Colombia, 
including the Casa de la Mujer. They describe themselves as “a feminist political 
project, national in character, working for a negotiated end to armed conflict in 
Colombia and to render visible the effects of war in the lives of women” (as cited in 
Cockburn, 2007, p.19).         
 UN Women was created in 2010 by the UN General Assembly to accelerate the 
organisation’s goal on gender equality by combining the resources of previously 
distinctly working UN bodies in the context of an overall UN reform agenda. The main 
roles of UN women include facilitating the work of inter-governmental bodies of 
formulating policies and global standards, supporting member states both technically 
and financially in their implementation efforts of these standards, forging ties with civil 
society as well as regularly monitoring accountability and progress of the UN’s efforts 
of promoting gender equality. UN Women has regional offices and my interview 
partner therefore was a representative of UN Women Colombia. 
Women’s Link Worldwide is a Spanish-Colombian organisation mainly 
composed of lawyers which focuses on advancing women’s rights, such as reproductive 
rights, and which seeks to support women facing multiple inequalities in particular. It 
was founded in 2001 and strives to bring a gender perspective to human rights law 
thereby bringing attention to women’s rights violations which are undocumented. The 
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organisation is of an international orientation, with regional offices in Latin America 
and Europe, and expanding partnerships across East Africa. 
OIDHACO is a network of European and international organisations dedicated 
at advancing the rule of law, democracy, the respect for human rights, and sustainable 
peace and development in Colombia. The main cooperation partners of OIDHACO 
thereby are the United Nations, the European Union, Sweden and Norway in their strife 
for a political settlement of the Colombian armed conflict. 
This field trip benefited from financial support provided by the Archimedes 
Foundation and the European Regional Fund. 
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